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ABSTRACT 
The War on Terror, as the outcome of the al Qaeda attacks on the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, promises to be the effort of a 
generation.  If it is to win, the United States must approach it in a manner reminiscent of 
successes in past wars:  with clearly defined and obtainable national objectives, and a 
unified national strategy to obtain those objectives.  In addition, it must establish a clear 
long-term vision for transforming its efforts and its institutions from the industrial age to 
the information age as the new domain for waging war.   
This thesis examines the War on Terror from several perspectives.  First, is the 
strategic context in which the war is being conducted, particularly the issues involved in 
its prosecution.  Second, the Vietnam War and the War on Terror are examined in 
historical contexts to determine if the United States is repeating the strategic mistakes 
that led to its defeat in Vietnam.  Third, transformation imperatives are identified; these 
require the Nation to consider what it must do to win the War on Terror while 
simultaneously preparing for the emergence of greater forms of information age warfare.  
Finally, an adaptive capabilities-based approach is suggested for the United States to deal 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
“The significant problems we face cannot be solved at the same level of thinking we had 
when we created them.” 
−Albert Einstein (attributed)1 
 
A. THESIS STATEMENT 
This will be a critical analysis of United States strategy in the War on Terror 
using established principles of war, as applied to past wars in the industrial age, 
particularly the Vietnam War, and adapted to emerging concepts of warfare in the 
information age, to address the questions:  Is the United States repeating the strategic 
mistakes in the War on Terror that caused it to lose the Vietnam War?  What factors are 
shaping the nature of the environment and the nature of the engagement?  What strategic 
factors will drive the United States to transform its efforts in the War on Terror to the 
information age?  How can United States success in the War on Terror be measured?  
What must the United States do to look beyond the War on Terror and prepare for the 
new strategic paradigm that confronts it? 
 
B. PURPOSE 
The results of this analysis are of primary importance to the Department of 
Defense and the Department of Homeland Security if they are to avoid great expenditure 
of materiel and loss of life in a losing effort, as occurred in Vietnam, and which available 
evidence suggests is a possible outcome of the War on Terror.  Such a result would have 
extreme strategic long-range negative implications for the United States by weakening its 
global posture and inviting future challenges from its adversaries.  This analysis is also of 
considerable importance to the American public.  As the events of 9/11 demonstrated, the 
United States can be attacked on its home territory by its potential adversaries in the War 
on Terror.  A successful national strategy, as well as transformation of that strategy to 
emerging forms of warfare in the information age, is necessary if future attempts to attack 
the United States or its interests, at home or abroad, are to be defeated or prevented.                                                  




This thesis is a qualitative approach using a four-part methodology.  First, a 
review is conducted of the problematic strategic issues that define current United States 
efforts in prosecuting the War on Terror.  Second, a comparative case study of American 
experience in both the Vietnam War and the War on Terror is made, to place them in 
context and determine if the United States is repeating past strategic mistakes.  Third, 
environmental factors are discussed, including both the historical evolution of modern 
war as well as emerging concepts of war, which will drive transformation of the United 
States effort in the War on Terror from its current adversary-focused industrial age 
approach to a capabilities-focused information age approach.  Fourth, a conceptual 
approach for conducting the War on Terror in the information age is recommended.  The 
research will be accomplished by reviewing both existing and emerging bodies of 
literature and evidence.  From this analysis, it should be possible to develop a proposal 
for transforming the United States effort to achieve victory in the War on Terror while 
simultaneously preparing for the emergence of more advanced forms of future warfare 




II. WHY STRATEGY MATTERS 
“You know you never defeated us on the battlefield,” said the American colonel. 
The North Vietnamese colonel pondered this remark a moment.  “That may be so,” he 
replied, “but it is also irrelevant.” 
  −Conversation in Hanoi, April 19752 
 
 
“We thank God for appeasing us with the dilemma in Iraq after Afghanistan.  The 
Americans are facing a delicate situation for both countries.  If they withdraw they will 
lose everything and if they stay, they will continue to bleed to death.” 
−Ayman Zawahiri, September 20033 
 
 
The two statements above, separated by 28 years of history, reflect a common 
element for the United States in both the Vietnam War and the War on Terror – the lack 
of a cohesive wartime national strategy.  They also reflect the views of enemies that, 
unable to defeat the United States militarily, adopted long-term strategies of attrition to 
defeat the national will of the United States.  The War on Terror, as the outcome of the al 
Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, 
promises to be the effort of a generation.  If it is to win the War on Terror and prepare 
itself for the era of warfare that follows, the United States must approach it in a manner 
reminiscent of successes in past wars:  with clearly defined and obtainable national 
objectives, and a unified national strategy to obtain those objectives.  In addition, it must 
establish a clear long-term vision for transforming its efforts and its institutions from the 
industrial age to the information age as the new paradigm for waging war.  Parameters for 
the new paradigm can be found by studying the lessons from past United States wars, and 
by evaluating them against emerging concepts of warfare in the information age. 
                                                 
2 Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (New York: Dell 
Publishing Company, Inc., 1984), 21. Conversation on 25 April 1975 in Hanoi between Colonel Harry G. 
Summers, Jr., then Chief, Negotiations Division, U.S. Delegation, Four Party Joint Military Team and 
Colonel Tu, Chief, North Vietnamese (DRV) Delegation, as reported by Colonel Summers. 
3 Anonymous (Michael Scheur), Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror (Dulles, 
Virginia: Brassey’s, Inc., 2004), xxi. “Recorded Audio Message by Ayman Zawahiri,” Al-Jazirah Satellite 
Channel Television, 10 September 2003, as reported by Anonymous (Michael Scheur). 
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For example, when the strategic reasons for the United States loss in the Vietnam 
War are considered against its current efforts in the War on Terror, parallels can be 
found.4  In Vietnam, the United States expended the majority of its strategic military 
effort against the Viet Cong insurgency in South Vietnam, which it viewed as the main 
North Vietnamese effort.  Although the United States military succeeded in destroying 
the Viet Cong insurgency, it did not prevent North Vietnam from attaining its strategic 
objective of defeating American public support for the war and forcing the United States 
to withdraw from South Vietnam in defeat, thereby leaving South Vietnam open to 
conquest by conventional forces.  In actuality, destruction of North Vietnam’s regular 
forces, which ultimately overran South Vietnam, should have been the main strategic 
military objective of the United States.   
In the War on Terror, the United States is currently expending the majority of its 
strategic military efforts against insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, which can be 
viewed as fronts in the larger War on Terror.5  However, the United States has not clearly 
defined its adversaries, or its overall strategic objectives in the War on Terror.  Al Qaeda, 
however, has clearly stated its intent to bleed the United States economy as a means of 
defeating American public support for the war.  The insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq 
are likely not the main effort against the United States, and it is not certain that in its 
military engagement against them the United States is winning the War on Terror.  In a 
manner reminiscent of Vietnam, public opinion polls reflect that, while the American 
public continues to support the overall War on Terror, it is growing increasingly 
disenchanted with the War in Iraq.  The first strategic objective of the United States 
should be the defeat of al Qaeda.  
Additional factors, which define the character of the War on Terror, also have to 
be considered.  First, the Vietnam War was an ideological struggle between a western 
industrialized world power and an Asian agrarian nation, fought using industrial age 
                                                 
4 The 9/11 Commission Report, Authorized Edition (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 
2004), 361-398. Chapter 12 of The 9/11 Commission Report lays out a blueprint for a United States global 
strategy in the War on Terror. 
5 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, 2005, 1. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_national_strategy_20051130.pdf (accessed 02/09/06) 
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methods and weapons.  The War on Terror is a war along cultural lines between a 
western information age world power and information age non-state entities.  It will be 
fought using information age methods and weapons which focus more on networking of 
organizations and processes than military strength.  Information age technology, which 
has eliminated concepts of time and distance, virtually guarantees that the War on Terror 
will again be brought to United States soil, as it was on 9/11.  Second, the ongoing 
reorganization of the United States government and its intelligence community will play 
an as-yet-to-be-determined role in the War on Terror.  Finally, the implications of the 
War on Terror are global.  The experience of the United States, and its outcomes, will 
have implications for the world community as a whole in the information age.  
 
A. THE NEW STRATEGIC REALITY 
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 introduced the United States to a new strategic 
reality, one which will confront the Nation for generations to come.  No longer can the 
United States rely on the conventional protections of time and distance as a result of 
being surrounded by vast oceans and air space.  Instead, non-conventional attacks may 
come with little to no notice, and they may occur against United States citizens and 
interests at home as well as abroad.  In the War on Terror, an existential war of ideas, 
future attacks on the United States may originate from within as well as from outside the 
Nation’s borders. 
Nor can the Nation rely on the time between wars to reconstitute itself and focus 
on future threats.  Instead, the new strategic reality, the context in which the Nation finds 
itself in the War on Terror, is similar to that in which the Army finds itself – that war is 
now the norm, the steady state environment, and not the exception.6  It is a protracted and 
continuous war of finite conventional resources arrayed against infinite asymmetrical 
threats.  The implications of this new strategic reality are clear:  the Nation must come to 
understand the character of the threat it faces and adapt accordingly.  Failure to do so 
                                                 
6 Department of the Army, Posture Statement (2005).  http://www.army.mil/aps/05/  (accessed 
02/09/06) A statement on the posture of the U.S. Army 2005, by the Honorable Francis J. Harvey, 
Secretary of the Army, and General Peter J. Schoomaker, Army Chief of Staff, presented to the First 
Session, 109th Congress, February 6, 2005. 
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could have grave strategic consequences and invite challenges to American political, 




Figure 1.   The New Strategic Reality.7      
 
Figure 1 illustrates the new strategic reality that confronts the United States today, 
as well as its dilemma.  While most of the nation’s conventional military resources are 
postured to deal with traditional military threats this thesis proceeds from the assumption 
that the more immediate and likely threat, and that to which the United States is more 
vulnerable, comes from unconventional threats from either state or non-state entities.  
This assumption is derived from the body of literature on the subject and it has been the 
greatest focus of United States efforts since the terrorist attacks of 9/11.  Ultimately, the 
                                                 
7 Department of the Army, Posture Statement (2005), 1.  http://www.army.mil/aps/05/. (accessed 
02/09/06)  Figure 1 was adapted and modified from the original.  The Army Posture Statement reverses 
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greatest threat to the nation, to be discussed in Chapters III and IV, may not be military at 
all, but may come from non-military methods of waging war. 
The national challenge for the nation in the War on Terror will be to transform its 
approach away from industrial age concepts that focus on conventional, symmetrical 
military threats and responses; are based on hierarchical command and control (C2); and 
which are geography-based across territory and space.  Instead, it must adopt a network-
centric multi-disciplinary approach based on the understanding that a fundamental shift 
of power has occurred from industry to information.  The new paradigm must be rooted 
in information age concepts that focus on non-conventional, asymmetrical threats and 
responses, to include non-military methods of applying force to wage war, and non-
hierarchical C2.  It must expand beyond the geographical base of territory and space, to 
defeat the threats to which the United States is most vulnerable. 
Perhaps the most significant aspects of the new strategic reality are its persistent 
nature, resulting in a blurring of the familiar distinctions between war and peace, 
potential for elimination of the distinction between combatants and noncombatants, and 
erasure of the foreign-domestic divide.  These are the by-products of the information age 
paradigm for waging war.  The Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review 
Report (2006) acknowledges the nature of the new strategic reality in its opening 
statement, “The United States is a nation engaged in what will be a long war.”8  Military 
leaders and government officials have taken to calling the War on Terror the “long war,” 
which is “recognition that there is no end in sight.”9 
In the War on Terror, there can be no time for a strategic pause to reset or to plan 
for the future.  Instead, the time horizon to address the strategic gaps in preparedness and 
performance is now, while engaged.  Traditionally, the strategic military planning time 
horizon has been measured in months, years, and even decades.  The strategic time 
horizon in the War on Terror is measured in the seconds, minutes, and hours in which 
asymmetrical attacks can occur.  These timelines are incompatible and must be 
reconciled.                                                    
8 Department of Defense,  Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2006),  v. 
http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report.pdf  (accessed 02/09/06) 
9 Josh White and Ann Scott Tyson, “Rumsfeld Offers Strategies for Current War,” Washington Post 
(February 3, 2006). 
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Yet, more than three years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, many 
issues concerning the War on Terror, and United States strategy in conducting it, while 
simultaneously preparing for the type of warfare that will follow it, remain in transition 
and continue to lack clarity and resolution.  Two schools of thought offer themselves for 
consideration: Whether the United States can win the War on Terror by continuing to 
refine its existing conventional symmetrical military strategies and methods of the 
industrial age, or whether it must adopt new asymmetrical strategies and methods 
appropriate to the information age.   
The issues that shape these two schools of thought can be observed within several 
lines of inquiry including:  issues of definition to achieve a focused national effort, issues 
of doctrine as a tool for shaping the national effort, issues of policy to guide the national 
effort, issues of strategy to accomplish the national effort, and issues of transforming the 
national effort from the industrial age to the information age.   
Figure 2 illustrates the relationships of these lines of inquiry to one another.  
Issues of definition constitute the domain in which all the other lines of inquiry reside.  
The domains of doctrine and of transformation overlay themselves across the domains of 
policy and strategy, shaping the direction of each.  Within the domains of policy and 
strategy resides the national will and future United States success or failure in the War on 
Terror.  Peters alludes indirectly to the question of American national will in New Glory: 
Expanding America’s Global Supremacy when he says, “We have the cultural, economic, 
and military power to do what is necessary in these tumultuous times.  But we lack the 
vision.”10    
                                                 
10 Ralph Peters, New Glory: Expanding America’s Global Supremacy (New York, NY: Sentinel, 




Figure 2.   Issues in the War on Terror. 
 
 
B. ISSUES OF DEFINITION 
Lack of definition in the War on Terror is problematic.  While it allows national 
leaders the flexibility to define and redefine success in ways that suit political purposes, it 
also has potential drawbacks.  From an operational perspective, it potentially leads to lack 
of clarity and understanding, and thus lack of focused national effort along with its 
attendant risk of failure.  The very phrase “War on Terror” lacks definition, and therefore 
presents the United States with a strategic issue that inhibits its efforts to prosecute the 
war effectively.  As multiple sources have indicated, “terror” is not the enemy.  In the 
War on Terror, neither terror nor terrorism can be defeated since terror is a method and 
terrorism is a tactic.  From this perspective, neither terror nor terrorism takes on the 
characteristics of entities that can be subjected to defeat in the traditional sense.   
In February 2003, the White House released the National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism in which it defined America’s enemy as “terrorism” in general.11  The 9/11 
                                                 
11 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 1. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism/counter_terrorism_strategy.pdf .  
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Commission, recognizing the difficulty that the White House definition poses, further 
narrowed the definition when it declared that “the enemy is not just ‘terrorism,’ some 
generic evil,” but must be the “threat posed by Islamist terrorism – especially the al 
Qaeda network, its affiliates, and its ideology.”12  However, even this clarification by the 
9/11 Commission does not resolve the issue.  As Burke further notes, definitions are 
important.  In Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam, he points out that current 
definitions are subjective and, since terrorism is a tactic, the adoption by the United 
States of the phrase “War on Terrorism” is nonsensical.13  From an operational 
perspective, it does not allow a precise description of the problem confronting the Nation.  
Tilford goes even further in The War on Terror: World War IV and establishes a link 
between definitions and strategy when he declares that in the aftermath of the attacks of 
9/11, when the Bush Administration labeled its efforts the War on Terror, it made a basic 
and fundamental strategic error.14  From Tilford’s perspective, the error is so grave that it 
places the United States in the position of fighting a war that it could lose because it has 
misjudged the nature of its opponent. 
It is of note that the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism 
defines the enemy as “a transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, 
and individuals – and their state and non-state supporters – which have in common that 
they exploit Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends.”15  This definition, limited to 
the Department of Defense, further restricts the definition of the enemy by assigning it a 
connection to Islam.  It does not address information age entities not connected to Islam. 
Lack of definition further complicates United States efforts in coming to grips 
with the entity known as “al Qaeda.”  If al Qaeda represents the primary, or at least the 
most visible, opponent of the United States in the War on Terror its precise nature 
remains unclear.  From various sources, it can be ascertained that al Qaeda is, variously, 
                                                 
12 9/11 Commission Report, 362.   
13 Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam (New York: I.B. Taurus & Co Ltd, 2004), 
22. 
14 Earl Tilford, “The War on Terror:  World War IV,” A Reserve Officers Association National 
Security Report, Officer (October 2004), 38. 
15 Department of Defense, National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (2006), 4.  
http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/docs/2005-01-25-Strategic-Plan.pdf (accessed 02/09/06). 
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either a terrorist group,16 a stateless network of terrorists that represents a radical 
movement in the Islamic world,17 a venture capitalist firm that sponsors a terror network 
of networks,18 or not a terrorist group at all but a worldwide insurgency.19  
Understanding the differences among the definitions of al Qaeda is critical if the United 
States is to develop a clear strategy for victory in the War on Terror.  Each of the various 
definitions invokes a different strategy for its defeat and failure on the part of the United 
States to employ the correct strategic approach invites failure overall.  Ultimately, in 
order to defeat al Qaeda as a precursor to winning the War on Terror, it may be necessary 
to accept several conditions:  That al Qaeda is a non-state entity that possesses elements 
of each of the definitions above; that it is constantly evolving its methods, tactics, and 
philosophy, i.e., the very essence of what it is; that it is very successful in attracting 
adherents; and that it may represent the forerunner of both terrorism and future warfare in 
the information age. 
The definition of victory in the War on Terror is also problematic.  The National 
Strategy for Combating Terrorism acknowledges this when it states, “Victory against 
terrorism will not occur as a single, defining moment.”  Instead, it will consist of an 
open-ended and “sustained effort to compress the scope and capability of terrorist 
organizations, isolate them regionally, and destroy them within state borders.…”20      
The problem with this definition is that it offers no end state, no reasonable expectation 
that the War on Terror can be brought to conclusion.  As a matter of practicality, it may 
not be possible to eliminate terrorist groups entirely.  The strategic alternatives of 
rollback, containment, or elimination of terrorist threats are discussed more fully in 
Chapters IV and V. 
                                                 
16 United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, 
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17 The 9/11 Commission Report,  362-363.   
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20 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,12.   
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A final definition, which poses difficulty for the United States in the War on 
Terror, is the legal status of its adversaries.  Are those individuals who carry out terrorist 
acts against the United States and its interests criminals or are they armed combatants?  
The difference is critical in bridging the foreign-domestic divide defined by the 9/11 
Commission and crafting a wartime strategy.21  A primary example is the legal status of 
the al Qaeda detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  The 9/11 Commission 
recommended that the United States should develop a coalition approach for the 
detention and humane treatment of captured international terrorists, possibly structured 
on Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions on the law of armed conflict.  This is at least tacit 
acknowledgment that the detainees are recognized as armed combatants and should be 
accorded some of the protections of the Geneva Conventions.22  However, in a decision 
that was issued nearly simultaneously with the release of The 9/11 Commission Report, 
the United States Supreme Court ruled that detainees at Guantanamo Bay can take their 
cases that they are unlawfully imprisoned to the American court system.23  The impact of 
the Supreme Court’s ruling is that it calls into question whether the United States is 
legally at war in the War on Terror, or whether it is actually pursuing a law enforcement  
action.  By offering protections of the United States legal system to the detainees, it 
appears that the Supreme Court does not recognize the War on Terror as a war according 
to legal and historical definitions. 
As indicated above, many of the issues that currently affect the War on Terror can 
be traced to lack of definition, lack of clarity, and diffused rather than focused effort.  
This has the benefit of allowing policy makers to maintain flexibility in defining and re-
defining success in many ways.  However, it poses great difficulty in developing  
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effective strategy and conducting precision operations.  Lack of definition also affects, 
for good or bad, the application of doctrine, policy, and transformation concepts to the 
War on Terror.  
 
C. ISSUES OF DOCTRINE 
By invoking the language, in other words the logic, of war in declaring the War 
on Terror the United States committed itself to its rules of grammar.  Tilford explains 
Clausewitz’s concept of grammar in the following way, 
The logic of war, violence directed by political intent, remains constant but the 
grammar changes.  Logic is a constant regardless of age, sex, ethnicity, 
nationality or cultural factors.  On the other hand, how one addresses a particular 
problem or issue, the methods used, is subject to a large number of factors such 
as age, sex, physical condition, resources, culture, religious beliefs and values.  
Applied to war, there is then a distinctly American way of war that differs 
significantly from the way Chinese or Russians or Zulus make war.  There is also 
a distinctly Muslim fundamentalist way of making war.  Clausewitz’s point is 
that although nations and groups make war in different ways based on a large 
number of factors [grammar], they go to war for one logical reason only: to force 
an enemy to do their will.24   
Tilford’s reference to Clausewitz opens the door to modern war fighting concepts. 
Current United States contemporary conventional military doctrine for fighting wars 
derives its foundation – its rules of grammar – from the writings of nineteenth-century 
Prussian General Carl Philipp Gotlieb von Clausewitz, particularly his seminal thesis, On 
War.25  Despite being published posthumously after Clausewitz’s death in 1831, On War 
continues to shape current American military thinking.  While this may seem 
incongruous, this 173-year old source remains the most modern authority available on the 
essence of war.  Unlike other disciplines in which bodies of literature have evolved, 
“Clausewitz’s work stands out among those very few older books which have presented 
profound and original insights that have not been adequately absorbed in later 
literature.”26  Simply put, no one has produced a better description of the essence of war 
and the immutable principles for its conduct in nearly two centuries.  It is considered by 
                                                 
24 Tilford, “The War on Terror:  World War IV,” 37. 
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 14
many to be the greatest work on war and strategy ever produced by Western civilization, 
and its key concepts can be used to put the War on Terror in perspective.   
The first concept that Clausewitz offers is his definition of war as “an act of force 
to compel our enemy to do our will.”27  The War on Terror is not unique, and it would be 
a mistake to see it in any way other than strategic context.  To begin, Clausewitz’s 
definition of war can be broken into three elements.  They are, first, that the effort is 
directed toward an identified opponent; second, that it involves violence or use of force to 
compel our opponent to fulfill our will; and third, that we know our national will.  In his 
chapter on war as an instrument of policy, Clausewitz also wrote that “war’s grammar, 
indeed, may be its own, but not its logic.”28  The War on Terror does not present a new 
problem from Clausewitz’s logical perspective, but merely a modern application of an 
ancient concept. 
Second, Clausewitz declared that all wars could be considered acts of policy.  
Otherwise, the entire effort contradicts the history of war.  It is absolutely essential 
therefore that, 
The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman 
and the commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on 
which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, 
something that is alien to its nature.  This is the first of all strategic questions and 
the most comprehensive.29 
To understand the true nature of the War on Terror will require not only a strict 
definition of the enemy, but also a knowledge and comprehension of the nature of the war 
itself.  For the United States to stray from this principle, again, invites failure.   
This leads to a third principle established by Clausewitz, that of the political 
objective.  To paraphrase, the political object is the goal, war is the means for reaching it, 
and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.30  Only upon 
establishment of the objective of the war can strategy be devised to achieve it.  Following 
                                                 
27 Clausewitz, On War.  75. 
28 Ibid., 605. 
29 Ibid., 88. 
30 Ibid., 80-81. 
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the logic of Clausewitz if al Qaeda is its most visible enemy in the War on Terror, then 
the United States must understand the nature of al Qaeda, and the nature of its conflict 
with al Qaeda.  It can then develop a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective 
with attendant strategy for the defeat of al Qaeda.  Lack of clarity of strategic objectives, 
in the long-term, has the potential to lead to a wearing down of American resolve, which 
ultimately can lead to defeat.  This is reminiscent of the lack of clarity of strategic 
objectives, described very clearly and eloquently by Summers, which contributed to 
American defeat in Vietnam.31 
Clausewitz put forth two additional sets of concepts that offer insight into the War 
on Terror.  They are the concepts of fog and friction, and the concepts of efforts that 
constitute preparations for war versus war proper.  The concept of fog in war refers to the 
uncertainty of the information that is available to the commander.32  Uncertainty can 
make problems seem, outside of perspective, larger than they really are.  In the absence 
of information, that which is not known is left to chance.  Friction is the concept that 
“everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult,” and the difficulties 
accumulate.33  Clausewitz envisioned an army as a very simple machine, but with a 
multitude of moving parts, each of which retains its independent capability to generate 
friction.   
Both fog and friction can be observed throughout the United States effort in the 
War on Terror.  The effects of fog can be found in the lack of clarity of information that 
exists at the policy, strategic, operational, and tactical levels of effort.  Friction can be 
observed in the homeland security related interagency conflicts between international, 
federal, state, local, tribal, and private agencies.  Both fog and friction have impacted the 
strategic gaps that exist between agencies such as that between the Department of 
Homeland Security and the Department of Defense; in the foreign-domestic divide 
described by the 9/11 Commission; in the lack of interoperability between agencies at all 
levels nationwide; and in the failure to share intelligence across agency boundaries.  
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32 Clausewitz, On War, 140. 
33 Ibid., 119. 
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Examples of fog and friction abound in the War on Terror, and were very well 
summarized by Rumsfeld when he said that the United States must be prepared “to 
defend our nation against the unknown, the uncertain and what we have to understand 
will be the unexpected.”34 
Finally, Clausewitz said that, “The activities of war may be split into two main 
categories:  those that are merely preparation for war, and [those that constitute] war 
proper.”  Preparations for war produce “the end product,” trained and equipped fighting 
forces.  War proper “on the other hand, is concerned with the use of these means, once 
they have been developed, for the purposes of [waging] the war.”35  The purpose of war 
is presumed to be the defeat of one’s enemy.  Similarly, the application of effort to the 
War on Terror should be divided into those activities that are preparations for war and 
those that are conduct of the war proper.  Both activities are necessary, but each should 
be considered separately and not confused one for the other when evaluating success.  
Nor can they be separated from objective and strategy. 
The outcome of the Vietnam War is an example of the result that can occur when 
preparations for war and war proper are confused with objective and strategy.  In 
referring to the United States defeat in Vietnam, Summers asks the question, “How could 
we have succeeded so well [tactically and logistically], yet failed so miserably 
[strategically]?”36  He opens his analysis of the Vietnam War with this declaration: 
At the height of the war, the Army was able to move almost a million soldiers a 
year in and out of Vietnam, feed them, clothe them, house them, supply them with arms 
and ammunition, and generally sustain them better than any Army had ever been 
sustained in the field.  To project an Army of that size halfway around the world was a 
logistics and management task of enormous magnitude, and we had been more than equal 
to the task.  On the battlefield itself, the Army was unbeatable.  In engagement after 
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35 Clausewitz, On War, 131-132. 
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engagement, the forces of the Viet Cong and of the North Vietnamese Army were thrown 
back, with terrible losses.  Yet, in the end, it was North Vietnam, not the United States 
that emerged victorious.37 
The Army’s accomplishments in Vietnam could not have been accomplished 
without the application of preparations for war on a large scale.  In essence, the Army did 
everything it was designed to do in Vietnam, but it failed to achieve United States 
victory.  The failure can be viewed in two ways.  First, the activities that constituted 
preparations for war, e.g., logistics, personnel, and resource management were not always 
distinguished from war proper, resulting in misdirection of priorities.  The result was a 
systems analysis approach to the Vietnam War that overrode strategic planning.  Second, 
both preparations for war and war proper were directed toward an objective and strategy 
that were flawed.  Regardless of the success of the overall effort, its support of a flawed 
strategy doomed it to ultimate failure. 
How does the United States avoid making a similar mistake in the War on Terror?  
Much of the current homeland security effort in the War on Terror – reorganization of 
government, critical infrastructure protection, and scenario-based planning are examples 
– are defensive actions that take on the guise of preparations for war.  They do not 
directly, in and of themselves, defeat al Qaeda or any other adversary.  It is not certain 
that they are even effective deterrents.  Those offensive diplomatic, information, military, 
law enforcement, and economic actions that are taken to apply force directly to terrorist 
adversaries to defeat them and force them to accept the will of the United States are 
examples of war proper.  In the final analysis, it will be necessary for the United States to  
ensure that its efforts, both those that constitute preparation for war, as well as those that 
constitute war proper, are directed toward clearly defined, decisive and attainable 
objectives and strategy for victory. 
 
D. ISSUES OF POLICY 
First and foremost, the policy question must be asked:  Is the United States truly 
at war in the War on Terror?  The determinations of the 9/11 Commission Report indicate 
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that the United States is in popular deed, if not in legal fact, a Nation at war, and lead to 
its recommendations for establishing national objectives and a national strategy for 
conducting the War on Terror.38  The findings of the 9/11 Commission meet two of the 
three critical elements in Clausewitz’s military-political definition of war.  First, that the 
effort is directed toward an identified opponent; and second, that it involves violence or 
use of force to compel our opponent to fulfill our will.  According to the 9/11 
Commission the United States opponent in the War on Terror consists of the terrorist 
groups and their allies, particularly the global al Qaeda network, that form the threat of 
Islamist terrorism, thereby satisfying the first element of war: an effort directed toward an 
identified opponent.39  Although there are problems with this definition, particularly that 
it falls short of defining the full scope of the threat to the United States, it represents a 
start toward development of a national objective and strategy.  The use of American and 
allied forces to find and destroy terrorist groups, most notably in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
partially satisfies the second element of war: the use of violence or force to compel our 
opponent to fulfill our will.40  The issue to be resolved is whether the insurgent groups in 
Afghanistan and Iraq are the right enemy, at the right time, and in the right place. 
The third element in Clausewitz’s military-political definition of war, that we 
know our national will, is partially, but not completely, satisfied by Public Laws 107-40 
and 107-243.  These laws, from a legal perspective, are not a formal declaration of war.  
However, they give the president broad powers to prosecute the effort that has come to be 
known popularly as the War on Terror.  Under the provisions of Public Law 107-40, the 
president is authorized to use force against those nations, organizations, or persons who 
planned and carried out the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, and 
those that harbored them, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism 
against the United States.41  Public Law 107-243 authorizes the president to use the 
armed forces of the United States to defend the United States against the threat posed by 
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Iraq, and to enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.42  In 
such manner a portion of the national will, the political will, of the United States is 
presumed to be established, even without a formal declaration of war. 
This poses a number of policy problems in the War on Terror.  The rules for 
invoking the national will are embedded in Article I, Section 8 of the United States 
Constitution, which gives to Congress – the elected representatives of the American 
people – the power to declare war.  A declaration of war – to establish the national will – 
therefore becomes a shared responsibility between the political will of the government 
and the popular will of its constituents.  This is more than just a formality.  Failure by 
Congress to declare war in Vietnam led to a failure to mobilize the popular will of the 
United States public and ultimately contributed to the Nation’s defeat.  A declaration of 
war gives the President clear-cut military authority, as well as non-military options, 
including internment of armed combatants and seizure of foreign funds and assets.  A 
formal declaration of war in the War on Terror may have precluded the Supreme Court’s 
decision to grant detainees at Guantanamo Bay access to the protections of the United 
States judicial system.  Further, according to Buckley, 
To declare war is not necessarily to dispatch troops, let alone atom bombs.  It is 
to recognize a juridically altered relationship and to license such action as is 
deemed appropriate.  It is a wonderful demystifier… [leaving] your objective in 
very plain view.43 
An acknowledgement of the need for the United States to establish objectives in 
the War on Terror, and to develop strategy to achieve those objectives, is found in the 
9/11 Commission’s recommendation that the United States should, “consider what to do 
– the shape and objects of a strategy,” and “how to do it – organization of [the] 
government in a different way.”44  Its recommended objectives are to attack terrorists and 
their organizations, prevent the continued growth of Islamist terrorism, and protect 
against and prepare for terrorist attacks.  The 9/11 Commission says the strategy must 
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incorporate offensive actions, with coalition partners, to counter terrorism; defensive 
actions with responsibilities for the Nation’s defense clearly defined; a preventive 
strategy that is both political as well as military; and finally, a responsive strategy that 
deals with attacks that are not prevented.  Finally, the 9/11 Commission recognized that if 
a national strategy is to be successful in the long-term, it must use all the elements of 
national power: intelligence, covert action, diplomacy, economic policy, foreign aid, and 
homeland defense.45  From its recommendations it appears that the 9/11 Commission is 
suggesting a single overarching strategy for the United States in the War on Terror. 
In actuality, the complexity of the undertaking has resulted in a proliferation of 
national strategies, of which there are no fewer than 20 covering multiple aspects of the 
War on Terror, and which deal with the problems of homeland security, homeland 
defense, and the War on Terror in piecemeal fashion, resulting in an approach that thus 
far is fragmented in its organization and disjointed in its application.  A reading of the 
various national strategies, as well as the emerging body of literature, does not render a 
clear understanding of United States policy, objectives, or strategy overall.  History 
dictates that failure of strategy has the potential to lead to overall failure in the War on 
Terror.  Key questions to be considered in trying to understand United States strategy in 
the War on Terror include:  Is the United States truly at war in the legal and traditional 
sense?  If so, what are United States objectives in the War on Terror?  What is the United 
States strategy for prosecuting the War on Terror in order to achieve its objectives?  Has 
the United States taken the strategic offensive or the strategic defensive?  What and 
where are the seams and gaps in United States strategy?  Finally, what must the United 
States do to transform its strategy from the industrial age to the information age? 
 
E. ISSUES OF STRATEGY 
Issues of strategy can be found in the growing body of literature concerning the 
War on Terror.  They often consist of anecdotal analyses that either affirm the success of 
ongoing United States military operations in Afghanistan or Iraq, or criticize the overall  
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effort as being misguided.  They can be applied to some of the various national strategies, 
a few of which are discussed below, in order to gain a clearer understanding of United 
States efforts in the War on Terror.   
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America was published 
prior to the creation of the 9/11 Commission.46  However, it broadly parallels the 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission of what the United States should do – employ 
all the elements of national power; and how it should do it – transform the major 
institutions of American national security to meet the requirements of the post-9/11 era.  
It reserves to the United States the option of preemptive actions to disrupt and destroy 
terrorist organizations of global reach.  In this sense, it forms a loose overarching strategy 
to secure the United States against terrorist attack.  It would be stronger if it addressed the 
numerous other national security strategies and outlined a method for pulling them 
together in a holistic effort.  A critical shortfall is that it defines America’s enemy as 
terrorism in general, but does not identify a single political regime, person, ideology, or 
religion.  In so doing it comes into conflict with both Clausewitz’s doctrine of war, as 
well as the 9/11 Commission’s specific recommended strategic objective of preventing 
the continued growth of Islamist terrorism.  It makes the fundamental strategic error 
espoused by Tilford, in that it does not clearly identify the enemy, nor United States 
national objectives regarding that enemy.47   
In its language the National Security Strategy of the United States may be 
contributing inadvertently to the motivations of al Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin 
Laden, in the War on Terror.  In its preface, the president clearly states the policy of the 
United States to “actively work to bring the hope of democracy” to “every corner of the 
world.”  In Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror, Anonymous 
(Michael Scheur) argues that it is precisely American policies and actions of the past 30 
years in Muslim nations, including pressure to conform to democratic principles, that 
have lead to the War on Terror.  American policies and actions “provide Muslims with 
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proof of what bin Laden describes as ‘an ocean of oppression, injustice, slaughter, and 
plunder carried out by you against our Islamic ummah.  It is therefore commanded by our 
religion that we must fight back.  We are defending ourselves against the United States.  
This is a ‘defensive jihad’ as we want to protect our land and people.’”48  Anonymous 
supports this argument with public opinion polls in the Muslim world, which indicate an 
overwhelming negative view of the United States.49  Whether democracy is a clear and 
obtainable objective in the War on Terror is questionable.  In Beyond Terror: Strategy in 
a Changing World, Ralph Peters takes the position that “Democracy must be earned and 
learned.  It cannot be decreed from without.  In a grim paradox, our [United States] 
insistence on instant democracy in shattered states…is our greatest contribution to global 
instability.”50  Efforts to push democracy on other sovereign nations may be perceived by 
those nations and their cultures as the ultimate example of American hubris.  It is this 
example that may lead them to respond to calls of war against the United States. 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security also predates The 9/11 Commission 
Report.51  Its stated purpose, “to mobilize and organize the Nation to secure the 
homeland from terrorist attacks,” seems to be a goal that would be more applicable to the 
National Security Strategy of the United States.52  Its objectives – of preventing terrorist 
attacks within the United States, reducing America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and 
response and recovery to terrorist attacks – are focused inward toward domestic 
preparations and constitute a primarily defensive and preventive strategy.  It is an 
example of what Summers described as taking the strategic defensive, which led to 
United States defeat in Vietnam.53  Much of what it prescribes for homeland security also 
conforms to Clausewitz’s definition of preparations for war instead of the conduct of 
war proper.  It does not provide an objective or a strategy for offensive actions to counter 
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terrorism, to preempt it by attacking and defeating terrorist organizations away from 
United States borders, or for taking the strategic offensive in the War on Terror.  In its 
current form it provides a good blueprint for the Department of Homeland Security but, 
despite having a segment devoted to American Federalism and Homeland Security, it 
does not provide any authority for directing how the various federal agencies are to work 
in synchronization with one another to prosecute the War on Terror.  Ultimately, in its 
call for implementation of homeland security measures, costing hundreds of billions of 
dollars to implement, it may play to al Qaeda’s strategic objective of bleeding the United 
States economy to defeat American resolve.54 
The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism makes the same strategic error as 
the National Security Strategy of the United States by describing America’s enemy as 
terrorism in general.55  It recovers from this initial misstep by laying out a well defined 
objective, which it refers to as strategic intent, in the War on Terror, and establishing a 
very clear strategy to achieve that objective.  Its stated objective, to stop terrorist attacks 
against the United States, and its citizens and interests worldwide and, ultimately, to 
create an international environment inhospitable to terrorists reflects a global perspective 
that is in line with the stated objectives of the 9/11 Commission.  Its “4D” strategy: to 
defeat terrorist organizations of global reach; deny terrorist sponsorship and sanctuary; 
diminish underlying conditions for terrorism; and defend the United States, its citizens, 
and interests at home and abroad, is also in line with the 9/11 Commission’s 
recommendation that a successful national strategy must use all the elements of national 
power.56  Whereas the National Strategy for Homeland Security is primarily an inward 
focused defensive strategy, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism advocates an 
outward focused strategic offensive to defeat terrorist threats before they reach United 
States borders.  It does not, however, link its provisions to those of the other competing 
national strategies. 
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The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America supports the 
National Security Strategy of the United States by clarifying the role of the Department of 
Defense in defending the nation.57  It departs from the other national strategies examined 
in that it addresses all threats to the United States and its interests, including terrorist 
organizations, as well as rogue states and regional powers.  It is global in nature with both 
an offensive and defensive strategic focus of conducting defense in depth of the United 
States, preventing conflict and surprise attack, and prevailing against adversaries.  One 
facet that sets it apart from the other national strategies is its focus on transforming the 
Department of Defense to meet the threats to national security of the information age.  In 
this respect it most clearly looks ahead to anticipate the nature of the transforming threats 
to the United States and anticipates what must be accomplished to defeat them.  Its 
shortfalls are that it addresses only the actions of the Department of Defense in homeland 
defense, and it does not address linkage to the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, 
or the other elements of national power.  It also reinforces the policy of the United States, 
spelled out in the National Security Strategy of the United States, to support the spread of 
democracy to other nations, and thus may be a causal factor of the War on Terror. 
In a manner similar to the arguments of Scheur and Peters above, Huntington, in 
The Clash of Civilizations, illustrates how the effort to spread democracy to societies that 
do not desire it can backfire.58  He describes the use of phrases such as “the world 
community” or “the free world” as euphemisms that are used to give global legitimacy to 
actions that reflect the interests of the United States and other Western powers.  In 
Huntington’s view the West essentially uses international institutions, military power, 
and economic resources to maintain Western predominance, protect Western interests, 
and promote Western political and economic values.  He further refers to Western efforts 
to impose liberal Western values on non-Western societies as “human rights 
imperialism.”  These efforts produce instead a backlash in the form of reaffirmation of 
indigenous values, as demonstrated in the form of increased support of religious 
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fundamentalism by the younger generations in non-Western cultures.  Modern 
democratic government originated in the West and when it has appeared in non-Western 
societies it has usually been the product of Western colonialism or imposition.  In non-
Western societies, these actions by Western powers call into question democracy’s 
legitimacy and put them – non-Western societies – into conflict with the West.  
Huntington’s argument is made more powerful today because, while elements of it are 
visible in the post-9/11 era, it significantly pre-dates the events of 9/11 and the War on 
Terror by a decade. 
This limited review of these key national strategies demonstrates the difficulty in 
relating United States strategy to its objectives in the War on Terror.  While its objectives 
are difficult to determine, its profusion of national strategies, published by various federal 
agencies have created two issues:  In some instances the strategies leave strategic seams 
and gaps in national security which remain vulnerable to exploitation, while in other 
instances they overlap resulting in unnecessary duplication of efforts and expenditure of 
resources.  The end result is to render the nation’s task of transforming its efforts from 
the industrial age to the information age all the more difficult. 
 
F. ISSUES OF TRANSFORMATION 
Arquilla has declared the War on Terror, “the first great war between nations and 
networks.”59  His remarks were further clarified on the fourth anniversary of the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 when he said, “If the Cold War was defined by an arms race in nuclear 
weapons, the war on terror has featured a race to build networks of warriors. It's a race 
we're losing.”60  Following Arquilla’s logic in the information age the conventional 
military-political nature of war as described by Clausewitz – the use of organized force 
for political ends – will come under question; and the means by which it is waged must 
both expand and transform to the characteristics of network-centric warfare.  The United 
                                                 
59 John Arquilla, Professor of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School.  Student notes from a 
lecture given on networks and netwar at the Naval Postgraduate School, Center for Homeland Defense and 
Security, to graduate students in Cohorts 403 and 404, on July 12, 2005.   
60 John Arquilla, “On the Fourth Anniversary of 9/11, the War on Terror Isn’t Going Well,” San 
Francisco Chronicle (September 11, 2005). 
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States must transform its institutions to take on the characteristics of networks if it is to 
acquire the capability to defeat its new adversaries in the social, information, cognitive, 
and physical domains of conflict that characterize the information age.  The 
transformation may call into question many of the principles espoused by Clausewitz, 
particularly that warfare is conducted primarily between nation states, and that it is the 
exclusive province of armies or other military means.   
A growing body of literature including such authors as Huntington, Kaplan, and 
van Creveld suggests that future war will move away from the principles of conventional 
trinitarian war established by Clausewitz, conducted between warring nation states and 
founded within each on the relationship between its government, its army and its 
people.61  It will be replaced by modern, non-trinitarian war between state and non-state 
entities organized along social, economic, criminal, terrorist, armed gangs, special 
interest, and ethnic lines to name but a few.  It will take on the characteristics of war 
without national boundaries, where the distinctions between public and private, 
government and people, military and civilian – i.e., combatants and noncombatants – will 
again become blurred as they were prior to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.62  
War itself will be redefined in the information age, both in the means as well as 
the methods by which it is conducted.  Hammes’ description of the evolution of war in 
The Sling and the Stone lays the foundation for understanding Fourth Generation 
(insurgent) Warfare (4GW), which the United States faces in the War on Terror.63  
However, simply to defeat Fourth Generation (insurgent) Warfare (4GW) will not be 
enough to win the War on Terror and to secure the Nation’s interests.  It will also be 
necessary for the United States to define and prepare for Fifth Generation (unrestricted) 
Warfare (5GW), discussed in Chapter IV, which will follow the War on Terror. 
As Cebrowski has noted national defense of the United States is no longer just 
about the Department of Defense, and homeland defense is no longer conducted solely at 
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62 Creveld, Transformation of War, 226. 
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long range.64  The United States must transcend purely military doctrine for a fully 
integrated diplomatic, information, economic, military, and law enforcement approach to 
the War on Terror.  Terrorist groups, both within and outside the United States, must be 
prevented from using information age technologies and methods to their advantage, and 
from acquiring the capabilities of global peer competitors.  
The Cold War transformed the American national security structure, infusing it 
with a conservative mindset – to preserve national security – and over time the United 
States came to resemble its adversary as its adversary came to resemble the United 
States.65  In the War on Terror the national effort must look outwards – moving beyond 
outdated concepts to embrace the information age – and in time the United States will 
come to resemble its new adversaries in the form of global networks consisting of both 
state and non-state entities.  As the nature of war transforms to the information age a true 
transformation of national efforts becomes an imperative and not an option, consistent 
with the information age transformation that is also occurring globally as well as in 
American society.  The imperative for transformation is summarized in the Network 
Centric Operations Conceptual Framework which states that, “The logic of the Cold War 
and the industrial age is giving way to a new logic, and hence, new rules and ways of 
doing things are needed.  If the United States…does not define these rules, then we run 
the risk of having them define us.”66  The United States must apply new ways of 
thinking, to include defining success, if it is to win the War on Terror, and prepare for the 
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G. ON INSTITUTIONALIZING IMAGINATION 
In its report the 9/11 Commission concluded that the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
revealed four kinds of American failure, foremost among them a failure in imagination.67  
In this failure the Commission states that, “Imagination is not a gift usually associated 
with bureaucracies….It is therefore crucial to find a way of routinizing, even 
bureaucratizing the exercise of imagination.”68  It follows this assertion with a chapter on 
global strategy and a concluding chapter with recommendations on reorganizing the 
federal government in order to achieve unity of effort in securing the Nation against 
future attacks.69   
However, it is not enough to simply reorganize the government in order to correct 
each of the individual failures which led to the 9/11 attacks, either as a means to secure 
the Nation, or as a means to prepare the Nation to conduct the War on Terror in the 
information age.  This approach would be bureaucratic in nature, but would fall short of 
achieving an institutionalizing of imagination.  Instead, a more strategic approach is 
called for, one which is capable of achieving a holistic outcome.  Writing nearly a year 
after the 9/11 attacks Arquilla provides a more accurate description of the nature of the 
problem confronting the United States: 
In the last year, our defense posture has shifted. We used to be focused 
exclusively on nations; now we are also focused on networks.  Networks like Al 
Qaeda are dangerous adversaries.  They have loose, difficult-to-trace 
organizational structures.  Vigorous efforts must be made to connect the dots of 
the network and its various dark allies.  Yet, for all our new focus on winkling 
out networked terror, we seem to have learned few lessons about the nature of 
"netwar”… 
Our leadership and, indeed, most other leaders around the world are new to this 
type of warfare. Clearly, the most important step they all can take right now is to 
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of awareness would open up the possibility of waging this war in new ways, 
rather than continuing to stumble along in a more traditional and ineffectual 
fashion.70 
This thesis takes a similar approach.  The issues of definition, doctrine, policy, 
strategy, and transformation discussed in this chapter are strategic in nature.  The 
bureaucratic process of approaching them individually in isolation would not lend itself 
to gaining a true understanding of the War on Terror in context.  Instead, a more strategic 
approach will be taken in succeeding chapters to establish a more imaginative and 
holistic view of the war and possible solutions to the new strategic reality confronting the 
Nation.  Chapter III is a case study comparison of the Vietnam War and the War on 
Terror.  Its purpose is to place the two wars in context, and to identify lessons from the 
United States defeat in Vietnam as a means to avoid future strategic errors in the War on 
Terror.  Chapter IV proceeds from the premise that, while lessons from past wars are 
relevant, each war remains a special case and must also be considered against the 
historical backdrop of the era in which it is fought.  Its focus is on the strategic 
weaknesses and gaps confronting the United States, and the fundamental changes in the 
national security environment that will drive the necessity for the Nation to transform its 
efforts in the War on Terror.  Finally, Chapter V uses the lessons from Chapter III, and 
the changing strategic environment discussed in Chapter IV, to recommend a strategic 
way ahead.  Its conclusion is that, while the United States fights the War on Terror, it 
must simultaneously prepare for the types of warfare that will follow it in the information 
age. 
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III. CASE STUDY – THE VIETNAM WAR AND THE WAR 
ON TERROR IN CONTEXT 
“[Mr. Bush] has got us into…the wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time.” 
                                                 −Arthur Schlesinger (2004) 71 
 
 “The peace we think we have is only another interregnum before another cycle of 
conflict.” 
−Robert D. Kaplan (2000)72 
 
In little more than a half century the United States has been involved in two wars, 
in Korea and Vietnam, which it did not win.  After three years of bloody fighting and 
more than 157,000 American casualties, including more than 54,000 American dead, in 
1953 the Korean War ended in an inconclusive stalemate where it initially began, along 
the 38th parallel.73   The casualties occurred in a conflict which the United States 
conducted in pursuit of limited political objectives.   
In This Kind of War, Fehrenbach concluded that the lesson of Korea is that it 
happened – a war of limited political objectives to contain communism, conducted at 
great cost and with enormous loss of life, and which accomplished no more than to 
restore the political status quo on the Korean peninsula.74   He further predicted that the 
United States would again be forced to fight wars of policy and limited political 
objectives before the end of the twentieth century.   
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Within ten years of the end of the Korean War the United States was again 
engaged in a war of limited political objectives, this time in Vietnam.  After more than 
ten years of conflict in Vietnam and Southeast Asia and more than 211,000 American 
casualties, including more than 58,000 American dead, in 1973 the Vietnam War resulted 
in the first national defeat in history for the United States.75     
In his post-war analysis of Vietnam Summers was left to ask his question, “How 
could we have succeeded so well [tactically and logistically], yet failed so miserably 
[strategically]?”  Indeed, on balance it appears difficult to grasp how a Western 
industrialized superpower could be defeated by an underdeveloped agrarian nation with a 
fraction of its population and no gross national product to speak of, without accepting 
that the stronger nation’s overall objectives and strategy in the war were flawed.  The 
lesson of Vietnam is that, when a war of policy and limited political objectives came 
again as Fehrenbach had predicted, on the battlefield the United States accomplished 
every military objective it set, but in the end North Vietnam, and not the United States, 
emerged victorious.   
As a result of the great devastation and suffering inflicted upon both North and 
South Vietnam, and the United States failure to stop the spread of communism to South 
Vietnam, Karnow, in his opening chapter to Vietnam: A History, characterizes Vietnam 
as the “war nobody won.”76  In Vietnam the United States failed in its application of the 
lesson of Korea. 
After more than four years, and more than 23,000 American casualties, including 
more than 5,000 combatant and noncombatant dead, the United States remains involved 
in another war which it has approached as a war of limited objectives, the War on Terror, 
in which the outcome is still not certain and which may not be decided for a generation to 
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come.77  Whether or not the United States will apply the lesson of Vietnam to the War on 
Terror remains to be seen.  For the nation to repeat its failure in Vietnam by achieving all 
its tactical military objectives in the War on Terror, yet fail to achieve strategic victory, 
would have grave consequences for both the United States and the international 
community. 
A common thread which unites all three wars in the cycle of conflict – Korea, 
Vietnam, and the War on Terror – is that, at some point, each has had the label “the 
wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time” applied to it in some fashion.78   The 
question of whether these wars were the wrong wars remains open to debate.  It may be 
that they were necessary to their times and the United States could not turn away from 
them.  It may be that it was necessary for the United States to fight both the Korean War 
and the Vietnam War against the larger backdrop of the Cold War.  Similarly, it may be 
that it was necessary for the United States to fight in Afghanistan and Iraq against the 
larger backdrop of the War on Terror.   
However, the question of whether each war achieved United States political 
objectives is more certain: In each case, the United States approached the war as a limited 
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war, without a formal declaration of war, and without public support - or with public 
support which eroded as the war progressed.  In Korea, the United States successfully 
prevented the communist unification of North and South Korea, but it did not prevent the 
long stalemate that has existed on the Korean peninsula for more than fifty years and it 
did not deter later communist efforts in Vietnam.  In Vietnam, the United States failed 
completely to prevent communist unification of North and South Vietnam.  The War on 
Terror has strategic parallels to Vietnam and analysis of them yields points for 
comparison and study.  
It becomes necessary to understand both the reasons for American defeat in 
Vietnam, as well as the direction of future wars, if the United States is to avoid continued 
great expenditure of materiel and loss of life in the War on Terror in a losing effort, as it 
did in Vietnam, and which available evidence suggests is still a possible outcome.  Future 
success in the War on Terror will have its foundation in the attainment of historical 
perspective on the new strategic reality.  Historical perspective will further enable 
resolution of the issues of definition, doctrine, policy, and strategy that currently exist in 
prosecuting any war in the information age.  Ultimately, perspective and resolution of 
issues will create the conditions necessary to establish the direction for transformation of 
the war effort and ultimately define the parameters for success. 
Even in victory, as Clausewitz noted, the result in war is never final.79  Even a 
defeated opponent may view the outcome as only transitory and seek a different outcome 
at a later time under different circumstances.  Understanding, to avoid the mistakes made 
in Vietnam, avoid potential loss in the War on Terror, and set the stage for future success 
in the information age, can be gained by an examination of the two wars against the 
principles of war related to the strategic environment, the nature of the engagement, and 
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A. THE STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE 
Following Clausewitzean logic, it becomes necessary first to define the nature of 
the war, not mistaking it for something else.  Upon that foundation, it follows that the 
enemy can be defined, and that clear and obtainable objectives for winning the war can 
be established.  The development of strategy follows the establishment of objectives.  
However, it is not clear that the true nature of the Vietnam War was established until 
after the war ended in defeat for the United States – nor has the nature of the ongoing 
War on Terror been clearly established. 
For the United States, the Vietnam War was an ideological struggle between 
communism and democracy due to the backing of North Vietnam by China and the 
Soviet Union.  The United States defined the Viet Cong guerrillas, an insurgency backed 
by North Vietnam, as the primary threat to South Vietnam.  Its objective for winning the 
war was to destroy both the North Vietnamese Regular Army and the Viet Cong through 
a war of attrition.  For North Vietnam, it was a war for reunification of North and South 
Vietnam after its partition by the Geneva Accords in 1954 and the subsequent failure to 
conduct promised free elections in 1956 to reunite the country.  The United States 
followed the trinitarian logic of Clausewitz in prosecuting its strategy for winning the 
war.  It deployed a professional combined arms military force – Army, Navy, and Air 
Force – to South Vietnam and used combined arms maneuver methods and tactics against 
the North Vietnamese Regular Army as well as the Viet Cong guerilla forces, which 
utilized primarily insurgent methods and tactics.  Overall, the clash was between the 
United States symmetrical industrial age means of waging war and the asymmetrical 
industrial age means employed by North Vietnam.  The United States focused on 
destroying North Vietnam’s insurgent and military forces by conventional military 
means, while North Vietnam was focused on destroying the American national will to 
fight through a strategic communications campaign to influence both international and 
American domestic public opinion and capture the political initiative.80 
Up to now, the United States main effort in the War on Terror has been very 
similar to that of the Vietnam War.  It has sizable combined arms military forces 
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deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq, the most visible fronts in the War on Terror if not the 
most critical.  Thus far, however, the United States has not adequately dealt with the 
apparent spread of al Qaeda as a global insurgency.  While the United States has focused 
its primary military effort on the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, indications are 
that al Qaeda has spread its global insurgency to ninety or more other countries.81  If 
accurate, this development would contradict any claims made by the United States on 
success in defeating al Qaeda in the War on Terror. 
The United States has approached the War on Terror as an ideological struggle, 
although it appears that the insurgencies and their primary backer, al Qaeda, see it as a 
cultural conflict.  Similar to the Vietnam War, in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States 
is employing industrial age symmetrical means in a war of attrition against insurgent 
adversaries who are increasingly employing information age asymmetrical means.  
Outside the Afghanistan and Iraq theaters, it is clear that al Qaeda is conducting an 
information age asymmetrical insurgency.   
In a manner very reminiscent of Vietnam, the United States is focused on 
destroying the insurgencies and al Qaeda, but al Qaeda is not focused on destroying 
United States conventional forces, which it cannot defeat militarily.  Instead, al Qaeda 
has stated publicly its intent to bleed the American economy and thus destroy the 
American political and public will to fight.  It can be argued that unchecked government 
spending for homeland security without measurable results plays to al Qaeda’s objective.  
Thus far, the strategic communications campaign of al Qaeda has been overwhelmingly 
successful.  By contrast, the United States strategic communications efforts have been 
largely ineffective or even nonexistent, and in one instance have resulted in unintended 
negative consequences.  As part of its information operations campaign in Iraq, the 
United States Army has paid for positive stories to be placed in local Iraqi media.  
However, “globalization of media, driven by the Internet and the twenty-four-hour news 
cycle, makes it likely that information campaigns targeting foreign audiences find their 
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way into U.S. media coverage.”82  In addition to distorting the accuracy of domestic 
media reports on military operations in Iraq, this potentially violates laws prohibiting 
military propaganda efforts that target United States audiences.  It is also reminiscent of 
Vietnam, when military information officers published optimistic accounts contrived to 
show progress, but which conflicted with the media dispatches of independent 
correspondents.  The result was a “credibility gap that, over time, eroded the American 
public’s faith in official statements.”83 
Two critical and conflicting analyses of United States failure in Vietnam have 
direct implications for the War on Terror.  In his seminal analysis, On Strategy: A 
Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, Summers uses Clausewitzean theory to explain 
how the United States managed to achieve tactical success yet succumbed to strategic 
defeat in Vietnam.84  Summers saw the Vietnam War as a struggle between two 
governments fighting one another in the classical trinitarian fashion, which symbolizes 
the modern era of warfare.  According to Summers’ analysis, the true threat to South 
Vietnam was not the Viet Cong insurgency, but conventional invasion by North 
Vietnamese regular forces.  His view is that both the United States and North Vietnam 
were fighting a conventional war.  However, the United States erred in expending its 
main effort against the Viet Cong insurgency, while failing to destroy the North 
Vietnamese Regular Army, which ultimately overran South Vietnam and, over time, 
ultimately lost its political and public will to fight. 
By contrast, in The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century, Hammes 
says that Summers misjudged the nature of the Vietnam War.85  Hammes does not refute 
Clausewitzean doctrine but supports it in his assessment that, in Vietnam, the United 
States failed to correctly define either the nature of the war or the nature of its enemy and, 
therefore, its objectives and strategies were flawed.  Hammes says that the conflict was 
not a conventional war between two nations following classical Clausewitzean concepts 
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of conventional trinitarian warfare.  Although the United States approached the Vietnam 
War from the perspective of conventional maneuver warfare to defend South Vietnam 
against a foreign invader, the North Vietnamese approached it quite differently.  The 
North Vietnamese recognized that they did not have the resources to defeat the United 
States militarily in an effort to reunify their country.  From the outset, against both the 
French and the Americans, the North Vietnamese employed the dialectic of insurgent 
warfare to destroy their opponents’ political and public will to fight by prolonging the 
war, while simultaneously carrying out a successful political strategic communications 
campaign. 
Following the logic of Hammes’ argument, the similarities between the Vietnam 
War and the War on Terror become apparent, and it appears the United States could 
repeat the same strategic mistakes it made in Vietnam.  The United States defeat in 
Vietnam emboldened its enemies and drew it into subsequent ill-fated conflicts by proxy 
in Afghanistan, Africa and Latin America.86  A similar defeat in the War on Terror would 
have similar consequences for the United States but, in the information age, they would 
be potentially unlimited orders of magnitude greater. 
 
B. THE ENVIRONMENT 
Since the American Revolution, the American public has maintained a unique 
symbiotic relationship with its military, embodied in the concept of “citizen soldiers” 
who are mobilized in time of war, and are representative of the public will.  Political will 
and military objectives are inextricably linked in United States military doctrine.  
Military operations are conditional upon the national will, as reflected by both the 
political will of the Congress and the public will of the people.  In the American system 
where there is no national will there can be no military campaign. 
Summers and Hammes differ in their analyses of the manner and means by which 
the United States prosecuted the Vietnam War.  However, they are in agreement on one 
key point.  Both authors conclude that the United States was ultimately defeated in 
Vietnam because it lost its national will - its political and public will - to fight.  A 
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lessening of public support for the War on Terror is manifested in public opinion polls, 
very similar to polls that were taken during the Vietnam War, which show declining 
support for ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Table 1 illustrates the 
similarities and differences in the national will of the Nation during the Vietnam War and 
in the War on Terror.  It has significant implications for United States capability to wage 
war in the post-modern era, when the traditional conventional parameters of war are less 
clearly defined. 
 
1. Political Will 
In both the Vietnam War and the War on Terror, the political will of the nation is 
brought into question by the lack of any formal declaration of war, as shown in Table 1.  
Although the United States Constitution vests the authority to declare war in the 
Congress Presidents have frequently found ways to bypass it.  By the middle of the 
twentieth century the Executive Branch of Government “had largely usurped the 
constitutional powers of the legislature in the realm of foreign affairs.”87    This has 
included the commitment of military forces by the Executive Branch to extended 
campaigns without declarations of war, including in Korea, Vietnam, and the War on 
Terror. 
As Buckley noted, to declare war “is to recognize a juridically altered relationship 
and to license such action as is deemed appropriate.  It is a wonderful demystifier… 
[leaving] your objective in plain view.”  Further, it mobilizes the Nation and it serves as a 
demonstration to its enemies, real and potential, of the force of its will and the gravity of 
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• No formal declaration of war 
• Gulf of Tonkin Resolution; 
based on the Gulf of Tonkin 
Incident which has since been 
criticized as likely inaccurate 
• No formal declaration of war 
• Public Law 107-40:  Authorization For 
Use of Military  Force 
• Public Law 107-243:  Authorization For 
Use of Military Force Against Iraq 
Resolution of 2002 
• Use of debunked intelligence on WMD 
to justify invasion of Iraq 
National Public Will:  
 
The People 
• Decision by President Johnson 
not to mobilize American public; 
strategic error 
• Ongoing efforts by Bush Administration 
to mobilize public support; mixed results 
 
Table 1. The National Will. 
 
With no formal declaration of war in either the Vietnam War or the War on 
Terror, justification for military actions was made through Congressional resolutions.  In 
both cases, the grounds for the Congressional resolutions were subsequently deemed 
questionable, and thereby caused not only the government to lose credibility but called 
into question the entire war effort globally as well as domestically.  In the case of 
Vietnam, the skirmish between American ships and North Vietnamese gunboats in the 
Tonkin Gulf was used by President Johnson to get Congress to pass the Tonkin Gulf 
Resolution.  “It authorized the President ‘to take all necessary steps, including the use of 
armed force,’ to defend South Vietnam and its neighbors and was used both by Johnson 
and President Richard M. Nixon to justify escalating the war…”88 
Similarly, in the War on Terror the Executive Branch, without a formal 
declaration of war, used questionable intelligence on the presence of weapons of mass 
destruction, as justification to intervene in Iraq to enforce Public Law 107-243.  The 
intelligence indicating that Iraq was in possession of weapons of mass destruction came 
from suspect sources that had not been verified, and has since been deemed not credible.  
The proof of its lack of credibility was confirmed by the failure of United States and 
Coalition forces to find any weapons of mass destruction following the invasion of Iraq.                                                   
88 Scott Shane, “Doubts Cast On Vietnam Incident, But Secret Study Stays Classified,” New York 
Times (October 31, 2005).   
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The result has been a loss of credibility for the United States throughout the world, but 
particularly in Muslim societies.  The long-term impact on United States strategic 
credibility and efforts in the War on Terror, and the response from its potential enemies 
in the post-modern era remains to be seen.  In an era that will be characterized by infinite 
enemy capabilities and finite United States resources, the failure to seek a formal 
declaration of war in the War on Terror, and the subsequent lack of credibility of its 
justification for invading Iraq, may turn out to be strategic errors. 
 
2. Public Will 
A number of factors contributed to the loss of public support for the Vietnam 
War, some of which are also present in the War on Terror.  By all accounts, the American 
public overwhelmingly supported President Johnson when he sent large numbers of 
American soldiers into battle in Vietnam in early 1965.89  In the end, however, the loss of 
public support for the war, and the decline in support of his policies for conducting the 
war ultimately convinced him to not seek reelection in 1968.  Several critical elements 
affected the decline in public support and subsequent United States defeat in Vietnam.  
President Johnson made a conscious decision not to mobilize the public will of the 
American people, as part of the national will, in support of the Vietnam War in order to 
not jeopardize his Great Society programs and to protect his legacy as a social reformer.90  
At the time, mobilization of the national will was seen as necessary to total war, an 
impossibility in the nuclear age, but not necessary for a limited war.  Ultimately, 
Johnson’s failure to arouse public will in support for the war was a grave strategic error. 
Other factors also contributed to the growth of the Vietnam anti-war movement in 
the United States and the creation of friction between the public and the federal 
government.  Among them was the decision to grant draft deferments to college students, 
which fueled anti-war militancy on college campuses; the advent of television which for 
the first time brought graphic images of war into American living rooms on a nightly 
basis; and the use of body counts as a the metric for gauging success in the war effort.  
                                                 
89 Karnow, Vietnam, 16. 
90 Summers, On Strategy, 34. 
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The combined effect of graphic images of death and destruction on a large scale in what 
it had been told was a limited war, was to turn the public away from a war that it 
perceived as being fought in a cold and deliberate fashion for limited objectives.  As 
Summers said, “We should have known better.  The lessons were there in the Korean 
War.”91 
Whether the lessons of Vietnam will be applied to the War on Terror remains to 
be seen.  Americans were universally outraged by the graphic live broadcasts of images 
of death and destruction during and immediately after the attacks of 9/11.  The result was 
an immediate galvanizing of the national will - political and public – to respond to the 
attacks.  In subsequent years, the images of 9/11 have been replaced by graphic images of 
continued death and destruction, including both military and noncombatants, in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and other areas of the world, particularly in the Mideast.  The 
American public has come to associate military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as the 
primary United States effort in the War on Terror.  The steady flow of graphic images 
and media reports comparing Iraq to Vietnam have generated a sort of public weariness 
with the perceived lack of progress in Iraq.  This has been reflected in the number of 
public polls which have indicated an increasing number of Americans consider the 
invasion and occupation of Iraq to be a mistake.  From the limited scope of these polls, it 
is not clear that the American public understands the true nature of the War on Terror as a 
generational effort that transcends and incorporates ongoing operations in Iraq. 
 
C. THE ENGAGEMENT 
Any discussion of the engagement in war must be based on the principles of war 
that have evolved from the philosophy of Clausewitz, and upon which United States joint 
military doctrine is based today.  Chief among them are the concepts of the objective and 
the strategy for achieving it, and the offensive as shown in Table 2.  A full discussion of 
                                                 
91 Summers, On Strategy, 66. 
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all the principles of war is outside the scope of this paper, however, a description of each 
can be found in Joint Publication 3.0, Doctrine for Joint Operations.92  
The discussion, of necessity, must also come back to Clausewitz’s definition of 
war as “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will,” and his dictum that leaders 
must first establish the kind of war upon which they are embarking and—not mistake it 
for something else.  Failure to adhere to these principles risks allowing the enemy to seize 
and retain the initiative in prosecution of the war, thereby greatly increasing the 
likelihood of defeat. 
 
1. Objective 
History shows that North Vietnam had a clear and obtainable political objective in 
Vietnam, as indicated by the results of its actions – communist reunification of North and 
South Vietnam, followed by attempted communization of all of Indochina.  By contrast, 
the United States political objective in fighting a limited war was not so clear.  Domestic 
issues, and the larger issue of containment of Soviet and Chinese communist global 
expansion, overshadowed United States objectives in Vietnam.  This resulted in failure 
by the United States to maintain the initiative in its efforts against North Vietnam.  By 
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Strategy & War 
Vietnam War War on Terror 
The Engagement   
Objective – Direct 
every military 




• North Vietnamese political objective, 
demonstrated by results, was the 
communization of Indochina 
• U.S. policy makers failed to frame 
tangible, obtainable political objectives  
• Al Qaeda, representing Islamist 
terrorism, political objective is defeat 
or destruction of the U.S.; clear and 
attainable 
• U.S. stated objectives are foster 
democracy/defeat of terrorism; not 
clear and attainable 
Strategy – Requires a 
knowledge of the 
nature of the war, and 
a strict definition of 
the enemy 
• North Vietnam lost at the tactical level; 
won at the strategic level 
• U.S. won at the tactical level; lost at the 
strategic level 
• Al Qaeda cannot win at the tactical 
level; has achieved great strategic 
success 
• U.S. has had great success at the 
tactical level; strategic aims are not 
clear 
Offensive – Seize, 
retain, and exploit the 
initiative 
• North Vietnamese strategic offensive to 
conquer South Vietnam.; tactical 
defensive via guerilla warfare; North 
Vietnam had long view of the war as 
total war; waited for failure of U.S. 
public opinion over time 
• U.S. strategic defensive against guerilla 
warfare; failed to direct strategic 
offensive against North Vietnam; U.S. 
had short view of the war as limited 
war, mistook guerilla operations as 
North Vietnamese strategy and spent its 
main military effort against the North 
Vietnamese secondary force; lost 
American public opinion over time 
• Strategic offensive by al Qaeda to 
destroy U.S.; tactical offensive via 
asymmetrical warfare; long view of 
War on Terror as total war; waiting 
for failure of U.S. public opinion over 
time 
• U.S. strategic defensive against 
insurgency in Iraq; inconclusive 
strategic offensive against al Qaeda; 
inconclusive view of war as limited or 
total, main military effort being spent 
against insurgency in Iraq instead of 
against al Qaeda proper; could lose 
American public opinion over time 
 
Table 2. Objective and Strategy. 
 
A similar process can be observed in the War on Terror.  The objective of al 
Qaeda as the most visible United States opponent, stated publicly and demonstrated by 
actions, is to defeat the United States by attacking its economy and bleeding it until 
bankrupt or until the United States loses its national will to fight.93  The United States 
objective in the War on Terror is not as clear.  Its stated objectives of “fostering 
democracy worldwide” and “defeating terrorism” are at best over-broad and likely not 
attainable.  At worst, they may be having the opposite of their intended effect by  
 
                                                 
93 Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress.  
Order Code RS32759, Library of Congress (June 20, 2005), 12; Anonymous, Imperial Hubris, 101. 
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stiffening resistance against the United States.  If the United States is to prevail in the 




In Vietnam, failure by the United States to define the nature of the war and the 
nature of its enemy resulted in an inability to apply force to compel North Vietnam to its 
will.  This is at the root of Summers’ question on how the United States could achieve all 
its tactical objectives yet lose the war strategically.  In hindsight, the problem for the 
United States was its application of maneuver warfare against North Vietnam’s 
application of insurgent warfare to destroy the United States national will to fight.  Since 
North Vietnam was focused on defeating the United States politically rather than 
militarily, it had the strategic advantage.  Two examples illustrate how North Vietnam 
exploited its advantage. 
In 1965, the United States conducted the Ia Drang Campaign in the Ia Drang 
Valley in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam.94  It was the largest direct clash 
between the conventional regular forces of each country during the entire war.  The 
thirty-four-day campaign resulted in an estimated 3,561 North Vietnamese killed versus 
305 American dead.  As a result, the American Commander in Vietnam, General William 
C. Westmoreland, concluded that the kill ratio – twelve North Vietnamese for each 
American – was evidence that a war of attrition could be successfully waged to bleed the 
North Vietnamese until they capitulated in defeat.  The Commander of North Vietnam’s 
forces, Senior General Vo Nguyen Giap, considered the results a draw because it had 
taught the North Vietnamese Army how to fight the Americans.  Despite North 
Vietnamese fears of American high-tech weaponry and revolutionary airmobile tactics 
using helicopters that were being tried for the first time in Vietnam, his conclusion was 
that the same insurgent strategy that had worked against the French would work again 
against the Americans.  History proves that Giap was correct and Westmoreland was 
                                                 
94 Harold G. Moore and Joseph L Galloway, We Were Soldiers Once…And Young (New York, 
HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 1992), 399. 
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wrong – a long war of attrition actually worked to the advantage of North Vietnam.  It 
could be argued that Giap understood the nature of his enemy while Westmoreland did 
not. 
Three years later, in 1968, North Vietnam launched the Tet Offensive throughout 
South Vietnam in an effort to bring about the final defeat of American and South 
Vietnamese forces with conventional warfare.  When the Tet offensive had expended 
itself in early 1969 North Vietnam had failed tactically and had suffered a crushing 
operational defeat.  North Vietnam had suffered an estimated 60,000 to 100,000 
casualties against 21,000 combined United States and South Vietnam casualties.95  
Significantly, the Viet Cong, North Vietnam’s guerrilla force in South Vietnam, had been 
decimated and would not recover as a fighting force before the end of the war.  The 
military balance in Vietnam had swung over to favor the United States. 
However, more significantly, while Tet drastically changed the military situation 
in favor of the United States, it had even more decisively changed the political climate in 
favor of North Vietnam.96  From 1965 to 1968, General Westmoreland had been 
publishing optimistic reports, based on body counts, that the United States was making 
progress in Vietnam.  The North Vietnamese Tet Offensive came as a shock to the 
American public and forevermore shifted its opinion against the war and the United 
States administration’s policies for waging it.  Although the United States never again 
lost the military upper hand, as a result of the Tet offensive it never regained public 
support or the strategic advantage.  Following President Johnson’s decision not to seek 
reelection, his successor, President Nixon, was left with little alternative but to withdraw 
United States forces from Vietnam in defeat. 
A similar process can be observed underway in the United States efforts in the 
Iraq front of the War on Terror.  In March 2003, the United States initiated conventional 
military operations to swiftly invade and defeat Iraqi conventional forces and occupy the 
country.  Less than six weeks later, in May 2003, President Bush declared the end of 
                                                 
95 WIKIPEDIA: The Free Encyclopedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tet_Offensive (accessed 
02/09/06). 
96 Hammes, Sling and the Stone, 65. 
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hostilities in Iraq.  Since President Bush’s declaration, the situation in Iraq, as the most 
visible effort of the War on Terror, has been similar to Vietnam in many respects.  Iraq 
and the War on Terror later became inextricably linked when the Bush administration 
declared, “Iraq is the central front in the global war on terror.”97  
Despite the declared cessation of hostilities, circumstances over the next six 
months made it clear that the United States was dealing with a determined insurgency.  
Two years later, in October, 2005, the number of Americans killed in Iraq passed 2,000, a 
plateau which has mostly occurred after the declared cessation of hostilities and which 
has been described by some as a psychological turning point for the American public.  It 
is too early to assess the accuracy of this claim.  During the same time period in which 
the United States administration continued to focus its public statements on the relative 
progress of establishing a lasting democratic form of government in Iraq, the leaders of 
the insurgency have focused its public statement on the injustices being visited on 
Muslims by the American presence.98   
Graphic images of killed and maimed Iraqi civilians, as well as images of the Abu 
Graib prison abuses, have been broadcast globally and have served as a catalyst for a 
growing insurgency in Iraq.  Reliable figures on the number of insurgents are not 
available but there are growing indicators that Iraq has become a training base for 
Muslim jihadists, well trained in urban warfare against American forces and who have 
begun to take the war abroad to other nations.99  In the War on Terror, including in Iraq, 
al Qaeda cannot win at the tactical level but has had great success at the strategic level.  
The United States has had mixed results at the tactical level but its strategic objectives are 
not clear.  
 
3. Offensive 
The purpose of the offensive is to retain the initiative and exploit it in order to 
maintain freedom of action and achieve decisive results.  North Vietnam used a strategic 
                                                 
97 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, 1. 
98 Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress,  
2. 
99 Rod Nordland, “Terror for Export,” Newsweek (November 21, 2005). 
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offensive and a long view of the war to conduct its campaign of unification in Vietnam.  
While using the Viet Cong as a secondary strategic effort to wage a guerrilla campaign in 
South Vietnam, as early as 1962 Ho Chi Minh envisioned a long war of attrition 
accompanied by intensive national and international propaganda – a strategic 
communications campaign – to defeat American resolve.  He explained it in the 
following statement: 
Sir, you have studied us for ten years, you have written about the Indochina War.  
It took us eight years of bitter fighting to defeat you French in Indochina….The 
Americans are stronger than the French.  It might perhaps take ten years but our 
heroic compatriots in the South will defeat them in the end.  We shall marshal 
public opinion about this unjust war against the South Vietnamese.100 
As a result of its failure to correctly define the nature of the war in Vietnam, and 
its application of conventional methods, the United States mistook its tactical actions 
against the Viet Cong insurgency in South Vietnam as the strategic offensive when in fact 
it had taken the strategic defensive.  North Vietnam, with its application of insurgent 
methods had taken a long strategic view of the war.  The United States, with a short view 
of the war, expended its main military effort against the Viet Cong insurgency.  Although 
it had succeeded in destroying the Viet Cong as a fighting force, by 1968 the United 
States had by then already irrevocably lost public support for its efforts in the war. 
In the War on Terror, al Qaeda has taken a long strategic view of the war as an 
existential war of ideas, while the United States has yet to demonstrate the same outlook. 
Al Qaeda appears to be directing a classic global insurgency against the United States 
while employing a very effective strategic communications campaign to sway 
international opinion.   
Despite the United States administration’s claims of progress, indicators are that 
the American public is receiving a mixed message.  In an ad hoc manner reminiscent of 
Westmoreland’s war of attrition strategy in Vietnam local commanders in Iraq have 
revived the process of announcing body counts to the media as an indicator of the relative 
success of local counterinsurgent operations.101  At the same time, insurgent attacks 
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using improvised explosive devices have been increasing, reaching an all-time high in 
2005 with 1,029 in August, 1,044 in September, and 1,029 in October of 2005.  This is an 
increase over the average of approximately 700 a month in early 2005.102   
 
Nature of Attacks 2004 2005 Difference 
Insurgent Attacks 26,496 34,131 + 29% 
U.S. Troops Killed 714 673 - 6% 
U.S. Troops Wounded 7,990 5,369 - 33%  
Car Bombs 420 873 + 108% 
Suicide Car Bombs 133 411 + 209% 
Suicide Vest Attacks 7 67 + 857% 
IED Attacks 5,607 10,953 + 95% 
Notes:  1.   The average success rate (attacks that cause damage or casualties) = 24% 
2. Insurgent attacks focused more on Iraqis and less on U.S. forces in 2005. 
3. The total number of U.S. casualties dropped from 2004 to 2005 but the number of attacks 
increased. 
 
Table 3. The Nature of Attacks In Iraq, 2004-2005 103 
 
Table 3 shows the way in which the nature of insurgent attacks in Iraq has 
changed from 2004 to 2005.  The Center for Strategic and International Studies indicates 
that, by one media estimate, for every United States soldier killed in Iraq at least thirteen 
Iraqi civilians are killed.104  Its conclusion is that the trends indicate “cycles in an 
evolving struggle, but not signs that the struggle is being lost or won…There have, as yet, 
been [no] decisive trends or no tipping points: simply surges and declines.”105 
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American public opinion polls on Iraq also show a strong similarity to public 
opinion polls taken in 1970 during the Vietnam War.  A USA TODAY/CNN/Gallup Poll 
taken in November, 2005, gave the following results:106 
More than half of those surveyed wanted to withdraw U.S. troops from 
Iraq within the next twelve months.  In 1970, roughly half of those 
surveyed wanted to withdraw U.S. troops from Vietnam within twelve 
months.  
In 1970, 56% said the decision to send troops to Vietnam was a mistake.  
(That number reached a high of 61% before direct American involvement 
in the war ended in 1973.)  Now [2005], 54% say the decision to send 
troops to Iraq was a mistake. 
[Similar to the erosion of public support for President Johnson’s policies 
in 1968] declining support has its own consequences for Bush, making it 
harder for him to maintain party unity behind his policy, especially as the 
2006 congressional elections approach.  Concern over the course and costs 
of the Iraq war has become a major factor in unease about the direction of 
the country generally. In January [2005], a 58% majority said things were 
going well for the United States.  By this month [November, 2005], only 
49% said things were going well. 
A Washington Post-ABC News Poll taken around the same time revealed similar 
results concerning public opinion about Iraq, and indicated that the public questions 
President Bush’s policies similar to the way it did President Johnson’s policies in 
1968:107  
Iraq remains a significant drag on Bush's presidency, with dissatisfaction 
over the situation there continuing to grow and with suspicion rising over 
whether administration officials misled the country in the run-up to the 
invasion more than two years ago. 
Nearly two-thirds disapprove of the way Bush is handling the situation 
there, while barely a third approve, a new low.  Six in ten now believe the 
United States was wrong to invade Iraq, a seven-point increase in just over 
two months, with almost half the country saying they strongly believe it 
was wrong. 
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About three in four − 73 percent − say there have been an unacceptable 
level of casualties in Iraq.  More than half − 52 percent − say the war with 
Iraq has not contributed to the long-term security of the United States. 
The same percentage − 52 percent − says the United States should keep its 
military forces in Iraq until civil order is restored, and only about one in 
five − 18 percent − say the United States should withdraw its forces 
immediately. In the week after U.S. deaths in Iraq passed the 2,000 mark, 
a majority of t hose surveyed − 55 percent − said the United States is not 
making significant progress toward stabilizing the country. 
The war has taken a toll on the administration's credibility:  A clear 
majority − 55 percent − now says the administration deliberately misled 
the country in making its case for war with Iraq − a conflict that an even 
larger majority says is not worth the cost. 
The president's handling of terrorism was widely regarded among 
strategists as the key to his winning a second term last year.  However, 
questions about Bush's effectiveness on other fronts have also depreciated 
this asset.  His 48 percent approval now compares with 61 percent 
approval on this issue at the time of his second inauguration, down from a 
2004 high of 66 percent. 
The United States is directing its main effort in the form of a conventional war 
against the insurgency in Iraq, which is not likely the main al Qaeda effort, and it has no 
significant strategic communications plan.  In 2004 the Report of the Defense Science 
Board on Strategic Communication stated, “Strategic communication is a vital 
component of U.S. national security.  It is in crisis, and it must be transformed…”108  As 
indicated above, the United States can still lose public support for its efforts in the War 
on Terror.  The Department of Defense acknowledges the importance of strategic 
communications to the War on Terror when it says, 
Victory in the long war ultimately depends on strategic communication by the 
United States and its international partners.  Effective communication must build 
and maintain credibility and trust with friends and foes alike, through an 
emphasis on consistency, veracity and transparency both in words and deeds.  
Such credibility is essential to building trusted networks that counter ideological 
support for terrorism.109   
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D. OBSTACLES TO THE GENERATION OF FORCE – FOG, FRICTION, 
INFLEXIBILITY 
Strategy in war is defined as both art and science of developing and employing 
the instruments of national power to achieve national objectives.110  Any discussion of 
strategy and the employment of power to achieve objectives must, of necessity, revolve 
around the application of force, the key element in Clausewitz’ definition of war as “an 
act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”  To Clausewitz, physical force was the 
means of war and its application was its object.   
The successful generation of force, and its application, are predicated on 
overcoming the obstacles to its generation.  Two of those obstacles, the concepts of fog 
and friction, also come from the writings of Clausewitz in On War.  The third obstacle to 
the generation of force, the concept of inflexibility, comes from van Creveld in The 
Transformation of War.  Simply put, the greater the military power, the less flexible it 
becomes.111  Van Creveld equates sheer size as a component of force.  The 
preponderance of numerical force plays a vital role in war but it creates its own problems.  
The flexibility and agility of tactical military formations are inversely proportionate to 
their size due to more cumbersome command procedures and longer reaction times.  
Smaller formations have less power, but greater flexibility and agility. 
These three obstacles to the generation of force – fog, friction, and inflexibility – 
are immutable because they pertain to the essence of force and its application in war as 
shown in Table 4.  It is the nature of force itself that has changed from Vietnam to the 
War on Terror.  In Vietnam, the United States relied solely on physical force in true 
Clausewitzean mode while the North Vietnamese considered political force to be more 
important.  In the War on Terror the concept of force must be expanded to include all the 
elements of force available to the Nation − not only physical, or military force, but also 
diplomatic or political, social, and economic. 
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Principles of 
Strategy & War 
Vietnam War War on Terror 
Generation of Force:  
 
Fog 
• Unclear U.S. objective and 
strategy – misjudged the 
nature of the war; 
conventional approach to 
defeat an insurgency 
• North Vietnam objective and 
strategy was clear – 
asymmetrical approach to 
defeat U.S. national will 
• Unclear, over-broad U.S. 
objectives and strategy; 
fragmented approach; misjudged 
nature of insurgencies in 
Afghanistan and Iraq; difficulty 
in defining the enemy 
• Al Qaeda objective and strategy 
is clear; asymmetrical networked 
approach to defeat U.S. national 
will 
Generation of Force: 
 
Friction 
• Conflict between U.S. 
government and its 
constituents 
• Confusion by U.S. of 
“preparations for war” and 
“war proper” 
• 9/11 attacks galvanized U.S. 
government and its constituents; 
friction between government 
agencies; growing lack of 
support by public 
• Confusion by U.S. of 
“preparations for war” and “war 
proper”; lack of unity of 
command and effort 
Generation of Force: 
 
Inflexibility 
• U.S. forces were large 
combined arms formations, 
with high-technology 
weapons, and heavy in 
logistical support; agility 
dependent on helicopters 
• North Vietnam forces were 
smaller, more lightly armed; 
no air or sea support; fewer 
logistics; more agile 
• U.S. forces in Afghanistan and 
Iraq are large combined arms 
formations, with high-technology 
weapons, and heavy in logistical 
support; agility dependent on 
helicopters 
• Al Qaeda-backed insurgents are 
more lightly armed; employing 
low-tech bombing campaign; 
fewer logistics; more agile 
 
Table 4. Obstacles to the Generation of Force – Fog, Friction, Inflexibility. 
 
Through its conventional approach to the Vietnam War, American leadership 
demonstrated that it could not see the true nature of either the war or its enemy through 
the fog of war.  This imperfect knowledge came partly from an inability to see the war 
through the eyes of its adversary, and partly from national hubris.  After all, how could a 
nation as wealthy and powerful as the United States – a nation capable of destroying the 
world with its nuclear arsenal, a superpower that had been fought to a draw in Korea, but 
had never been defeated in war – how could such a nation possibly lose a brushfire war 
against a bunch of peasants who had no high-tech weapons of any kind, who had no 
transportation, no air force or navy, who traveled by foot and carried their supplies on  
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their backs in a far off corner of the world?  Through this fog and lack of understanding, 
the United States committed itself to a conventional war of attrition, thinking it could 
bleed a smaller nation into submission. 
The North Vietnamese did not see the situation through the same strategic fog.  
They knew they could not defeat the United States militarily so they changed the 
paradigm of force.  Lacking the physical force to win on the battlefield, they focused on 
political force where they could compete as equals before an international audience, as 
well as in front of the American public.  The Tet offensive was a mistake by the North 
Vietnamese leadership; however, despite the crushing tactical and operational defeat they 
suffered, at the strategic level they won the political war and all that was required was to 
continue their strategic communications campaign while waiting for the inevitable 
American withdrawal from South Vietnam. 
Friction between the United States government and the American public during 
the Vietnam War worked just as Clausewitz described:  The simplest things became 
difficult, and the difficulties accumulated.  Over time, the friction became so great that 
the public lost faith in the government’s efforts to conduct the war.  Due to the unique 
relationship the American public has with its military – its citizen soldiers – when public 
support is withdrawn, the military campaign must, of necessity, come to an end.  As a 
result of Vietnam, not only a military campaign came to an end, but a presidency as well. 
Despite the effects of fog and friction, if North Vietnam had succumbed to 
American strategy and attempted to confront the United States militarily it would have 
lost the war.  Through the use of high-tech weaponry and the revolutionary airmobile 
tactics it introduced in Vietnam, the United States Army was able to overcome the 
paradox of power.  With the advantage of helicopters, it was able to overcome the 
disadvantages of cumbersome command and control, and shorten its reaction time to 
achieve a degree of flexibility and agility that enabled it to take advantage of its 
overwhelming upper hand in sheer numbers and firepower.  In the end, however, sheer 
physical military power was not enough to win the war. 
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Many of the processes that caused the United States to lose in Vietnam are 
similarly at work in the War on Terror.  Fog is readily visible in the proliferation of 
overlapping and often conflicting national homeland security and homeland defense 
strategies since the 9/11 attacks.  The cumulative effect is lack of clarity of objectives and 
strategy.  The expansion of al Qaeda globally while the United States has focused its 
efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the time lapse that occurred in those two countries 
before the United States realized it was fighting a determined insurgency, suggest again 
that, just as it did in Vietnam, the United States has approached the war with imperfect 
knowledge.  Again, this imperfect knowledge comes partly from an inability to see the 
situation from the perspective of the Muslim world, and partly from hubris.  
Friction in United States efforts in the War on Terror is evident in at least two 
respects.  First is the growing public disaffection with United States operations in Iraq.  
The inability by the public to see progress in Iraq has the potential to carry over into a 
prolonged sense of war weariness toward the War on Terror as a whole.  Simultaneously, 
the reorganization of the United States government has created friction of its own, which 
has the potential to misdirect the national war effort.  The result has been incessant 
competition for resources and control between local, state, and federal agencies, 
including intelligence agencies.  This has reduced national unity of effort overall in the 
War on Terror, and led to a preoccupation with homeland security efforts, which are 
better characterized as “preparations for war” instead of “war proper” in the Clausewitz 
model.  The results of friction became readily apparent in the muddled national response 
in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in August, 2005.  The incredibly inept response at 
all levels of government – local, state, and federal – has led some observers to question 
whether, four years after the attacks of 9/11, the United States has made sufficient 
progress in the War on Terror.     
Inflexibility continues to be an issue for the United States in the War on Terror.  It 
is saddled with a cumbersome federal bureaucracy for homeland security, homeland 
defense, and intelligence.  Globally, its strategic military operations are conducted 
regionally under the operational control of joint combatant commanders.  Its solution to 
inflexibility from the tactical operations in Afghanistan and Iraq to the strategic levels of 
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command in Washington is a greater reliance on technology in the form of faster, more 
powerful, and more sophisticated communications, weapons systems, battlefield sensors, 
and helicopters.  Recognition that the greatest numbers of American casualties in the War 
on Terror are as a result of low-technology bombs employed by insurgents in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, has led to modifications of tactics, techniques, and procedures to 
mitigate the effects of the bombs.  It has not led to a reduction in the frequency of 
insurgent bomb attacks, which have actually increased over time.  Overall, the United 
States effort has all the characteristics of maneuver warfare similar to Vietnam, but with a 
greater application and reliance on technology to generate force.  It is not certain that 
technology has given the United States an edge against the insurgencies in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, but it has become its Achilles’ Heel. 
Thus far, the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq have taken a similar approach 
to fighting the United States as the North Vietnamese did in Vietnam, with one 
exception:  the information age has given them universal access to technology that was 
not available to the Vietnamese.  It has also changed the concept of force and made them 
more resilient against it.  Thus far, they have successfully employed a successful 
insurgent strategy to bleed American forces while working to defeat the national will to 
fight through a strategic communications campaign utilizing Internet postings of 
messages and atrocities, the Arabic news agency al Jazeera, and the global media.  
Through a prolonged campaign of low-tech bombings, they have inflicted a high number 
of casualties on the Iraqi population, and a steady number of casualties on United States 
forces.  Most of the casualties occurred after President Bush publicly declared the 
cessation of hostilities in Iraq, and they have effectively slowed the democratization 
efforts of the United States in Iraq while creating a sense of disaffection in the American 
public.  Neither al Qaeda nor the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq appears to have 
been slowed by fog, friction, or inflexibility in generating force against the United States.  
Quite the opposite, they have proven to be very adaptive against the application of  
military force and indications exist that they are spreading their efforts globally.  At the 




When viewed against the strategic perspective – the nature of the environment 
and of the engagement, and obstacles to the generation of force – the immutable 
principles of war advanced by Clausewitz, become apparent.  Following Clausewitzean 
logic, strategic similarities between the Vietnam War and the War on Terror are evident.  
To violate these principles in the War on Terror invites possible failure as occurred in 
Vietnam.  To not violate them, however, does not guarantee success. 
Strategy in the War on Terror must also be considered against the era in which it 
is being waged, an era that is characterized by the transformation of cultures and of 
societies, including the United States, from the industrial age to the information age.  The 
transformation of societies will drive the transformation of warfare to conform to the 
paradigm of the information age.  Chapter IV will discuss the evolution of war and some 
of the transformation imperatives that will drive how the War on Terror, and future wars, 
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IV. TRANSFORMATION IMPERATIVES  
“…in the…post-modern, post-industrial age, warfare will not be totally dismantled.  It 
has only re-invaded society in a more complex, more extensive, more concealed, and 
more subtle manner…using all means, including armed force or non-armed force, 
military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy [the 
West] to accept one’s interests."  
−Col. Qiao Liang and Col. Wang Xiangsui, 
Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (1999)112 
 
 
“…we must move faster – increasingly, the pace of transformation is not one we set for 
ourselves.  National defense is no longer about the Department of Defense…nor is it 
conducted solely at long range.” 
−VADM Arthur K. Cebrowski (2004)113 
 
In the War on Terror, the United States finds itself at a turning point, one which 
confronts the Nation with the dilemma of a continuously evolving paradigm.  As implied 
by Col. Qiao Liang and Col. Wang Xiangsui of the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army, the 
Nation must rise to the threat.  However, this time the threat to the nation represented by 
the new strategic reality is not solely military.  As VADM Cebrowski indicates, the pace 
of change, or of transformation in order to rise to the occasion, “is not one we set for 
ourselves,” and threats to the Nation may come from without, as well as from within.   
Viewing the War on Terror in context demonstrates that certain principles of war 
are immutable:  It is necessary to define the nature of the war, define the enemy, and 
define clear and obtainable objectives and a coherent national strategy to achieve them.  
However, the environment – the domains in which it will be fought, and the nature of the 
engagement – the means and methods by which it will be fought, do change and there can 
never be a certainty of victory.  Accordingly, while it is possible to learn from historical 
perspective, the Nation must also achieve an understanding of the future, the adaptive 
                                                 
112 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to Destroy America 
(Panama City, Panama: Pan American Publishing Company, 2002), xv.  
113 Cebrowski, “Transformation and the Changing Character of War,” 2. 
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enemy it faces, the nature of adaptive engagements, and accept that an environment of 
constant change and unrestricted warfare is inevitable. 
In Rethinking the Challenge of Counterinsurgency Warfare, Cordesman provides 
valuable insight into the enduring nature of the principles of war as they affect the War 
on Terror, and the backdrop against which it will be conducted: The information age.114  
First, according to Cordesman, while it is possible to learn from past wars, each war is a 
special case and it is necessary to focus on the task at hand.  Victory in the War on Terror 
will require a long strategic view and acceptance that the situation is truly complex.  As 
the war evolves, the enemy will learn and adapt; for every approach there will be a 
counter-development and a counter-tactic.  The United States must always consider its 
options.  Containment or rollback of terrorism may at times be a better alternative than 
unconditional defeat.  It is not possible to get the last terrorist, or even always to stay to 
the end, and there is a thin line between acceptable outcome, partial victory, and limited 
defeat.  It is necessary therefore to employ ruthless self-interest mixed with only one 
balancing consideration: Is the probable long-term outcome really worth American 
sacrifice? 
Second, Cordesman states that focusing solely on the military dimension is an 
almost certain path to grand strategic defeat in the War on Terror.  It will be necessary to 
use all the elements of national power in unconventional ways.  The concept of force 
must be expanded beyond mere military force to encompass social force, political force, 
economic force, technical force, and beyond.  Shaping conflict termination, and the grand 
strategic aftermath, is the primary definition of victory; it will require operations over a 
period of many years, and more likely, decades.  It will require winning hearts and minds 
in a practical sense.  Societies cannot live on the promise that tomorrow will be better; 
but must survive in the harsh reality of today.  It will also require brutal honesty in 
preparing the American people and allies for the true nature of the War on Terror.  They 
deserve no less, and without their support, the War on Terror cannot be won. 
                                                 
114 Anthony Cordesman, “Rethinking the Challenge of Counterinsurgency Warfare: Working Notes,” 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 7, 2005. 
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/051107_counterinsurg.pdf   (accessed 02/09/06). 
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Finally, Cordesman argues that it will be necessary to focus relentlessly on the 
desired outcome of the war and not individual battles or the overall military situation.  
The Nation cannot afford to underestimate the enemy or its own vulnerability as it did in 
Vietnam; capable opponents will always fight the United States either above or below its 
threshold of conventional warfighting capability.  The weak can defeat the strong through 
merciless unconventional methods, and the first rule of unrestricted warfare is that there 
are no rules, with nothing forbidden.115  To achieve victory requires winning politically, 
not militarily, through the use of full-spectrum operations.  Establishment of democracy 
should be the last, and not the first, priority in the War on Terror; security, safety, and 
basic needs – food, water, shelter, effective governance and services, rule of law and 
limits to corruption, education, health, and employment all have a much higher priority.  
Establish these first and democracy can begin to develop and flourish; fail to establish 
them and fledgling democracies will likely collapse.  “Positive attitudes” and “group-
think” are self-inflicted wounds; what is needed is ruthless strategic objectivity.   
In confronting the new strategic reality the conceptual challenge for the United 
States will be to transform its current strategic approach away from industrial age 
concepts that focus on conventional, symmetrical threats and responses that are suitable 
to conventional maneuver warfare.  It must develop instead information age concepts that 
focus on non-conventional, asymmetrical threats that employ unconventional warfare, yet 
can be adapted to threats that employ unrestricted warfare.  The practical challenge will 
be to address existing weaknesses and gaps in United States strategy, adapt to 
fundamental changes in the national security environment, and develop a grand strategy 
for success.  The Nation must rise beyond the military operations underway in 
Afghanistan and Iraq – they are but fronts in the War on Terror – and embrace full 
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A. THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN WAR  
One way to place the War on Terror in historical and social perspective, to define 
the enemy and to define the nature of the war, is to consider it against past wars and 
advancements in human societies.  Figure 3 shows how the nature of conflict has changed 
as human societies have advanced.  Using this model it can be expected that the War on 
Terror will take on more and more the characteristics of cultural conflict, and it will be 
fought using information age weapons and methods.  This will be driven both by the 
clash of large-scale cultures, as well as by an increase in the number of nation states and 
non-state entities resulting from the end of the Cold War.   
Regardless of the viability of these new entities on the world stage all will have 
access to information age resources.  The result will be an increase in the numbers of 
entities willing to use information age methods in the application of force and violence, 
to achieve their aims.  The strategic implications for the United States are large, making it 
more critical than ever for the Nation to define the nature of the War on Terror.  To do 
otherwise would again risk failure as occurred in Vietnam.  
Emerging bodies of literature, as well as historical experience, suggest that the 
nature of conflict is evolving along cultural fault lines, and will be transformed by the 
information age.  Huntington, in The Clash of Civilizations, makes a strong argument 
that, with the end of the Cold War, the fault lines between civilizations are increasingly 
replacing political, ideological, and even geographical boundaries as the flash points for 
conflict and crises.116   
 
                                                 




Figure 3.   Evolving Nature of Conflict117 
 
Should Huntington’s argument hold true, conflict between civilizations, similar to 
that between Islamic States and Western States, could become the dominant global form 
of conflict.  Non-Western civilizations and cultures, represented by both nation states as 
well as non-state entities, will continue to strive to acquire the economical, technological, 
and military strengths that accompany modernization, thereby putting them into 
competition with Western civilizations and cultures.  It will be necessary for the United 
States, as the dominant Western power, to understand the basic religious, philosophical, 
and political underpinnings of non-Western cultures and how those cultures view their 
own interests.  As a multi-cultural society, the fault lines of other civilizations and 
cultures run through the United States as well, and represent the points at which future 
conflict could also fracture the Nation.  Future threats to the United States may originate 
from within, as well as from outside the Nation. 
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Another way to approach the War on Terror and place it in perspective is to 
consider the ways in which the means of waging war have evolved, and will continue to 
evolve.  Figure 4 illustrates the evolution of the means of conflict, designated here into 
pre-modern, modern, and post-modern eras.   
 
 
Figure 4.   Evolving Means of Conflict.118   
 
That which can be considered modern war dates back to the Peace of Westphalia 
in 1648, which ended the Thirty Years War of the major European continental powers, 
fought mainly along religious lines between Catholics and Protestants.  Besides bringing 
the Thirty Years War to a conclusion the Peace of Westphalia, actually a series of 
treaties, had another longer-lasting impact - it ushered in the era of the nation state which                                                  
118 Figure 4 was compiled from concepts found in: Creveld, Transformation of War. Department of 
Defense, Office of Force Transformation, Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare (2005).  
http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_387_NCW_Book_LowRes.pdf  (accessed 02/23/06); 
Huntington, “Clash of Civilizations,” Kaplan, Coming Anarchy, Shattering The Dreams of The Post Cold 
War. 
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remains predominant in the world today.  In the modern era the rise of nation states with 
professional standing armies changed completely the means by which wars are fought, if 
not the nature of war itself.  However, the post-modern era will bring the demise of 
conventional war, the decline of professional standing armies, and an ushering in of 
means of war that are more reminiscent of the pre-modern era.   
A third way to gain perspective on the War on Terror is to consider the manner 
and speed with which the methods utilized to conduct war have evolved in the modern 
era, as shown in Figure 5.  In The Sling and the Stone Hammes describes how modern 
warfare in the twenty-first century has evolved as the result of political, economic, social, 
and technological changes that have occurred over time in societies.119   Hammes 
discusses four generations of warfare, and hints at what the fifth generation of war may 
look like.  Each generation represents a dialectically qualitative shift in the methods of 
waging war.  A litmus test for whether or not a change represents a generational shift in 
the methods of conducting war is that, controlling for disparities in size, an army from a 
previous generation cannot defeat a force from the new generation.120 
The rise of nation states in the modern era brought the development of First 
Generation (formation) Warfare (1GW), also referred to as Napoleonic war, with its 
utilization of armies against one another in massive line and column formations.  As a 
result of the industrial revolution and quantitative and qualitative improvements in 
massed firepower Second Generation (trench) Warfare (2GW) made its first appearance 
during the American Civil War, and gradually replaced First Generation (formation) 
Warfare (1GW).  It culminated with the trench warfare and mass slaughters of armies that 
occurred in Europe during the First World War.  Third Generation (maneuver) Warfare 
(3GW) was conceived by the Germans during World War I, and later introduced at the 
outset of World War II by the German Wehrmacht with its conquest of Europe.  It 
                                                 
119 Hammes, Sling and the Stone, 14; William S. Lind; Keith Nightengale, Colonel (USA); John F. 
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1989; Hammes uses the description of the first three generations of war from the Lind, et al, article as a 
basis for his description of the development of Fourth Generation War.  He makes only passing reference to 
Fifth Generation War, which he says he is certain is currently developing somewhere in the world.  
120 William S. Lind, “Fifth Generation Warfare?”  Center for Cultural Conservatism, Free Congress 
Foundation (February 2004), 1. 
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resulted from further improvements in available technology and is characterized by 
combined arms operations – sea, air, and ground – and rapid maneuver of mechanized 
formations.  Third Generation (maneuver) Warfare (3GW) has been the dominant form of 





Figure 5.   Evolving Methods of Conflict.121 
 
Fourth Generation (insurgent) Warfare (4GW) is a concept originated by Lind and 
refined by Hammes in The Sling and the Stone.  Its application was first conceived by 
Mao Tse Tung during the Chinese Revolution from 1925-1927, and used successfully to 
defeat the Nationalist armies of Chang Kai-shek and install a communist government in 
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China.  Fourth Generation (insurgent) Warfare (4GW) has several characteristics which 
give it a dialectical edge over Third Generation (maneuver) War (3GW) and enable 
quantitatively and qualitatively inferior forces to win over superior government forces.  It 
uses asymmetrical strategy and tactics, applied over long periods of time, to shift its focus 
away from destruction of the enemy’s superior conventional military forces – which it 
cannot defeat – and instead toward defeat of the enemy political will to fight.  It matches 
the political strength of one opponent against the political strength of the other.  In its 
common form it is insurgency warfare.  It was adapted and used successfully by the 
North Vietnamese to defeat the United States, by the Afghans to defeat the Soviet Union, 
and it is being used by al Qaeda today.  It is also characterized by its use of networks, its 
willingness to accept casualties, and its long length in time.  Fourth Generation 
(insurgent) Warfare (4GW) is measured in decades rather than campaigns lasting months 
or years.  The Communist Chinese fought for twenty-seven years; the Vietnamese fought 
the French, and later the Americans, for thirty years; and the Afghans, supported by other 
nations, fought the Soviets for ten years.122  Fourth Generation (insurgent) Warfare 
(4GW) stands unique thus far as the only type of warfare that has defeated a superpower, 
and it has done so on two occasions. 
Currently, no commonly accepted definition exists for Fifth Generation 
(unrestricted) Warfare (5GW).  However, given the rate at which change in warfare is 
accelerating it is reasonable to accept that Fifth Generation (unrestricted) Warfare (5GW) 
is already making its appearance.  It took hundreds of years from the development of the 
musket and cannon for First Generation (formation) Warfare (1GW) warfare to evolve.  
Second Generation (trench) Warfare (2GW) evolved and peaked in the 100 years 
between Waterloo and Verdun.  Third Generation (maneuver) Warfare (3GW) came to 
maturity in less than 25 years.123  Fourth Generation (insurgent) Warfare (4GW) was 
implemented immediately upon its conception in China seventy-five years ago, around 
the same time that Third Generation (maneuver) Warfare was implemented in Europe.   
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For the purpose of this thesis, Fifth Generation (unrestricted) Warfare (5GW) is 
defined as the use of “all means whatsoever – means that involve the force of arms and 
means that do not involve the force of arms, means that involve military power and 
means that do not involve military power, means that entail casualties, and means that do 
not entail casualties – to force the enemy to serve one’s own interest.”124  It includes the 
appearance of super-empowered individuals and groups with access to modern 
knowledge, technology, and means to conduct asymmetric attacks in furtherance of their 
individual and group interests.   Arguably, its first identifiable manifestations occurred in 
the United States during the anthrax attacks of 2001 and the ricin attacks of 2004.   Both 
sets of attacks required specialized knowledge, included attacks upon federal government 
offices and facilities, succeeded in disrupting governmental processes, and created 
widespread fear in the public.  To date, no individual or group has claimed responsibility 
for either attack, and neither attack has been solved.  The attacks were quite successful in 
disrupting government processes and creating public fear but, thus far, their motivation 
remains unknown.   
Today’s computer hackers, capable of disrupting governments and corporations 
on a global scale by attacking the Internet with malicious computer programs, may also 
be forerunners of super-empowered individuals and groups.  They have already 
demonstrated that they are capable of single-handedly waging technological campaigns 
with overtones of Fifth Generation (unrestricted) Warfare (5GW). 
The potential power of Fifth Generation (unrestricted) Warfare (5GW) was also 
demonstrated in the Madrid bombings of 2004.  On this occasion, a series of mass transit 
bombings conducted by a networked terrorist group in a single day, on the eve of national 
elections, resulted in a new Spanish government being voted into office, and the 
immediate withdrawal of Spanish military support to ongoing coalition operations against 
the insurgency in Iraq.  The Madrid bombings are significant because the terrorists 
behind them were also major drug dealers, part of a network running from Morocco 
through Spain to Belgium and the Netherlands.  Although the Madrid bombings are 
thought to have cost only about $50,000 to carry out, law enforcement authorities 
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afterwards recovered nearly $2 million in drugs and cash from the group.125  In these 
attacks, in which a group which represented an extensive transnational criminal enterprise 
successfully brought about regime change in a sovereign European nation, Fifth 
Generation (unrestricted) Warfare (5GW) demonstrated a dialectically qualitative 
advantage over the methods of both Third Generation (maneuver) Warfare (3GW) and 
Fourth Generation (insurgency) Warfare (4GW). 
 
1. Pre-modern Era – Low Intensity Conflict 
In the centuries immediately prior to the Peace of Westphalia modern nation 
states did not exist.   Wars, therefore, were not fought between governments employing 
standing armies.  Instead, wars during the pre-modern era were fought between 
monarchies, baronial factions, religious associations, commercial organizations, city-
states, tribal societies or even by gangs of ruffians against provinces and towns.    The 
dominant methods and weapons for waging war were those that were available in a 
primarily agrarian age.  The Thirty Years War, which was fought from 1618 to 1648, and 
culminated in the Peace of Westphalia was primarily a war between Protestants and 
Catholics over freedom of religion.  It heavily involved the various princes and kingdoms 
of the Holy Roman Empire in what is today modern Germany, Austria, the Czech 
Republic, Italy, Spain, France, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland. 
The prevalent motivating factors for waging war in the pre-modern era were 
religion, political gain or economic gain.  Anyone who had the financial means to raise 
an army for profit or personal gain could do so.  Extensive use was made of mercenaries 
and military entrepreneurs and control over them was lax.  Often they worked for the 
spoils of war.  No distinction was made between combatants and non-combatants and the 
greatest atrocities were committed upon the civilian populace.  At times, war was 
scarcely discernible from simple plunder, rape, and murder, and barbarity was the order 
of the day.   
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Historical examples abound of mass atrocities and large-scale human suffering as 
a result of war during the pre-modern era.  Much of the suffering perpetrated upon 
noncombatants came at the hands of soldiers of fortune.  Just as often the ravages of  
disease followed in the paths of marching armies to further decimate the civilian 
populace.  By some estimates, Germany lost up to a third of its population to conflict, 
famine and disease during the Thirty Years War.   
 
2. Modern Era – Trinitarian War 
With the Peace of Westphalia came the modern era of war and the development of 
modern nation states, a concept that has endured for more than 350 years.  The rise of 
nation states shifted the means of waging war from private hands and it became the 
province of governments.  No longer could war be waged by individuals or non-state 
entities.  To do so became characterized as crime.  War in the modern era took on a 
structure of its own, recognized by Clausewitz, and later described by van Creveld in The 
Transformation of War as trinitarian war.126  The trinity of government, army, and people 
within nation states and for waging war between nation states became predominant.  
Under the trinitarian construct of modern war governments wage war on one another, but 
not armies or people acting independently.  Following the logic that governments wage 
war, the means they use are professional standing armies.  This significantly changed the 
role of noncombatants.  Under the trinitarian concept war is no longer conducted at the 
expense of noncombatants, but on their behalf.  This idea of trinitarian war – of 
governments waging war, armies of combatants as the means for waging war, and the 
people as noncombatants on whose behalf war is waged – continues today.  It has become 
so universally accepted that bodies of international law including such agreements as the 
Geneva and Hague Conventions, and international organizations such as the United 
Nations, have been developed to protect it and preserve it.  
It was in this historical context that Clausewitz wrote On War and established the 
principles of war widely recognized by modern armies, and adhered to by the United 
States today.  Principal among them are the concepts of the political objective, the 
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strategy, and the offensive.127  A concept that cannot be separated from the principles of 
war is that of the generation of force, which derives from Clausewitz’ definition of war as 
“an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”  Virtually all wars between nation 
states in the modern era have been conducted in accordance with these principles. 
Other factors have influenced the means of waging war in the modern era:  The 
impact of the industrial revolution, the demise of conventional wars since 1945, and the 
ascendancy of Fourth Generation (insurgent) Warfare (4GW) in the form of insurgencies.  
The industrial revolution wrought not only fundamental changes in nations, but it shifted 
the balance of power to industry and, along with it, it brought an industrial focus to the 
means by which war is waged in the modern era.  It culminated in the great World Wars 
of the twentieth century which used industrial methods to wreak death and destruction on 
a global scale.   
The impact of the industrial revolution is still felt.  The current United States 
operational paradigm for waging war is a platform-centric approach that evolved from the 
experience of the United States military during the industrial-style wars of the twentieth 
century.  It is rooted in industrial age concepts that focus on conventional, symmetrical 
military threats and responses, and hierarchical command and control (C2).  It is 
geography-based across territory and space.   
In the time period since World War II the majority of the world’s professional 
conventional war making capability and professional military expertise has become 
concentrated in a relatively small number of developed industrialized nation states.  The 
advent of nuclear war capability among the world’s great powers since 1945, with its 
associated capability for massive retaliation, has made the notion of both nuclear and 
conventional war between them obsolete.  Simultaneously, the great powers have 
demonstrated to the lesser, non-nuclear nation states that neither can they compete with 
the great powers using conventional military means.  Lacking the military expertise of the 
great powers, the lesser nation states are restricted to using their conventional military 
means only against other lesser powers and, even then, to limited success.  These two 
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developments, the advent of nuclear war capability and the demise of conventional war, 
have resulted not in the elimination of war but an increase in low intensity conflict, 
particularly the use of insurgencies. 
Since the employment by the United States of nuclear weapons to bring World 
War II to conclusion, the only time that nuclear weapons have been used by one nation 
against another, the primary form of war worldwide has been neither nuclear war nor 
conventional war, but has been low intensity conflict.  Van Creveld argues that, of the 
more than 160 armed conflicts around the world since 1945, perhaps more than seventy- 
five percent of them have been characterized as low intensity.128    They have ranged 
from guerilla wars to terrorist actions or even police actions.  They are characterized by 
their tendency to occur in less developed regions of the world, the absence of regular 
armies on both sides, and the non-use of high technology weapons that are prevalent in 
modern armies.  If, as Clausewitz established and van Creveld argues, modern war is 
fought for political objectives then low intensity conflicts have been the most significant 
form of war in the past fifty years.  Throughout the world they have brought great 
political change, including against the world’s great powers, as well as former colonial 
empires.  Even the United States discovered this lesson in Vietnam, as the Soviet Union 
did later in Afghanistan. 
Van Creveld has described indirectly the methods of war reflected in Fourth 
Generation (insurgent) Warfare (4GW) as described by Hammes, which offers a 
fundamental shift away from the industrial age symmetrical focus on destroying an 
enemy’s armed forces to an information age asymmetrical focus on defeating an enemy’s 
political and public will to fight.  With its avoidance of direct confrontation with superior 
military forces Fourth Generation (insurgent) Warfare (4GW) redefines war as not 
primarily a military function.129  Clausewitz’ definition of war as “an act of force to 
compel our enemy to do our will” still holds true.  However, concept of force is expanded 
to include political, economic, and social, as well as military means.  Fourth Generation  
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(insurgent) Warfare (4GW) insurgencies have achieved overwhelming success in China, 
Vietnam, and Afghanistan, and are currently being used by insurgencies in Afghanistan, 
Iraq, and worldwide by al Qaeda. 
 
3. Post-Modern Era – Low Intensity Conflict Redux 
The processes by which nuclear war and conventional war have been rendered 
obsolete in the modern era will continue to evolve in the post-modern era but with a 
significant difference:  They will be profoundly influenced by the advent of the 
information age and will cause pre-modern war to reemerge as the predominant means by 
which war is waged.  Neither great nor lesser powers will be immune from their effects 
and will find themselves in conflict with entities they would scarcely have recognized or 
acknowledged in the modern era. 
Huntington predicts that as war moves from ideological conflict toward cultural 
conflict national borders will mean less than the fault lines that exist between societies 
and cultures, and where most conflicts will originate.130  The concept of nation states has 
been in existence for only the past 350 years, but human history has been about 
civilizations.  Among the reasons he cites in his argument for the decline of nation states 
are:  The differences between civilizations are basic, interaction between civilizations is 
making the world smaller, economic modernization and social change are separating 
people from local identities, economic regionalism is increasing, and cultural 
characteristics and differences are less mutable and subject to change than political and 
economic differences. 
Huntington’s arguments are supported by Kaplan who declares that world maps 
showing the world broken into clean political divisions of nations are an invention of 
modernism, specifically European colonialism.131  Kaplan argues that the concept of 
nation states is a Western notion, which until the twentieth century applied to only three 
percent of the earth’s landmasses.  Many nations that are labeled on maps today are not 
nation states at all, or are nation states in name only, particularly in the more 
underdeveloped regions of the world.  Examples of African nations that exist virtually in 
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name only include Somalia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Liberia, and the Ivory Coast.  Notably, 
the majority of Middle Eastern national boundaries are a Western invention.  They were 
created by the Treaty of Versailles when European politicians arbitrarily created the 
Middle Eastern national boundaries in existence today without any regard to local 
geography, tribal affiliations or national identity.  In the Western hemisphere it can be 
argued that Haiti is a nation in name only. 
The causes for the decline of nation states and international borders go beyond 
those advanced by Huntington.  According to Kaplan the decline will be brought on by 
demographic, environmental and societal stress, particularly in underdeveloped regions.  
The results will be exhaustion of natural resources combined with overpopulation, 
unchecked spread of disease, rampant crime, and large numbers of refugees. 
The impact upon the means by which war is waged in the post-modern era will be 
profound.  As a result of the continued spread of nuclear weapons nation states cannot 
afford to fight one another, either by nuclear means or with conventional armies, due to 
the fear of massive retaliation.  As the nature of war advances toward cultural conflict, 
and nation states decline, the result will be a return to low intensity conflict, which will 
resemble most closely the types of wars that were waged in the pre-modern era, prior to 
the Peace of Westphalia.  Its root causes will be control of natural resources, survival, or 
the political or economic gain of the entity waging it. 
Who will wage war in the post-modern era will also change, removing it from the 
exclusive domain of nation states.  Similar to the pre-modern era the world will see the 
rise of low intensity conflict formed along racial, religious, social, and political lines.  It 
will be waged by non-state entities in the form of tribal societies, city-states, religious 
associations, private mercenary organizations, commercial organizations, drug cartels, 
terrorist organizations, guerilla bands, and even super-empowered individuals and 
groups.  In short, as in the pre-modern age, anyone who possesses the economic and 
technical means to wage war, and who can control a territorial or information base, will 
be able to do so.  
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Van Creveld predicts that the conventional military forces of nation states will be 
replaced by militias, police forces, and armed gangs.132  The types of weapons used will 
move away from large, expensive weapons systems in favor of small cheaply 
manufactured weapons.  The impact, according to van Creveld will be that, 
As new forms of armed conflict multiply and spread, they will cause the lines 
between public and private, government and people, military and civilian, to 
become as blurred as they were before 1648.  The point may come where even 
our present notions of policy and interest – both of which are closely associated 
with the state – will have to be transformed or replaced by others more 
appropriate to the new circumstances.133 
The picture painted by van Creveld is bleak.  War will be fought at close quarters 
with bombs and other forms of improvised explosive devices.  It will be protracted, 
bloody, and horrible with no distinction between combatants and noncombatants.  
Barbarity will again become the order of the day and communities that refuse to fight for 
their existence will cease to exist. 
Significantly, neither Huntington nor Kaplan nor van Creveld address the single-
most influential event that will transform the nature and means of war in the post-modern 
era – the advent of the information age.  Above all else, the information age and the 
advent of network-centric capabilities will give non-state entities the capability to 
compete with nation states in ways never before seen in human history.  The terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, on the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon, are 
likely the forerunner of things to come.  Terrorism has often succeeded as a tactic but has 
generally failed as a strategy.  However, the rise of al Qaeda and its successful 9/11 
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon have blurred the lines between 
tactics and strategy.  The cost of the tactical assault by al Qaeda on 9/11 is estimated to 
have been around $500,000; but the strategic impact on the United States Government is 
eventual damages and recovery costs in excess of hundreds of billions of dollars.134  This 
is in addition to the resultant reorganization of the United States government, the 
hundreds of billions of dollars spent on global military operations in Afghanistan and 
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Iraq, economic aid to restore and rebuild those two nations, and reverberations in the 
American economy that are still being felt more than four years after 9/11. 
Fourth Generation (insurgent) Warfare (4GW), which has existed for seventy 
years, will continue to evolve as a form of insurgency, and Fifth Generation (unrestricted) 
Warfare (5GW) will continue its ascendancy.  With the 9/11 attacks al Qaeda effectively 
brought Fourth Generation (insurgent) Warfare (4GW) to American shores and 
demonstrated that the United States is not immune from it.  The anthrax attacks (2001) 
and ricin attacks (2005), which likely originated within the United States, further 
demonstrated the potential that Fifth Generation (unrestricted) Warfare (5GW) offers for 
super-empowered individuals and groups.  Arquilla and Ronfeldt recognized the 
significance of the 9/11 attacks when they wrote, 
Theory has struck home with a vengeance.  The United States must now cope 
with an archetypal terrorist netwar of the worst kind.  The same technology that 
aids social activists and those desiring the good of all is also available to those 
with the darkest intentions, bent on destruction and driven by a rage reminiscent 
of the Middle Ages…they [terrorists] confirmed the warnings…that information-
age terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda might pursue a war paradigm, 
developing capabilities to strike multiple targets from multiple directions, in 
swarming campaigns that extend beyond an incident or two.135 
Hammes considers the concept of netwar, as envisioned by Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 
as a complex, long-term type of conflict that has grown out of Fourth Generation 
(insurgent) Warfare (4GW).136  The implications for the United States in the information 
age are clear: Adapt to the new strategic reality or accept a decline in diplomatic, 
economic, social, and military preeminence in international affairs.  The emerging 
Department of Defense operational paradigm offers a model for the United States to 
adapt its instruments of power to the information age.  It is a network-centric approach 
based on the understanding that a fundamental shift of power has occurred from industry 
to information.  It is rooted in information age concepts that focus on non-conventional, 
asymmetrical threats and responses, and non-hierarchical C2.  It expands beyond the 
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geographical base of territory and space.  Network-centric operations seek to create an 
information advantage and translate it into an operational advantage. 
 
B. STRATEGIC WEAKNESSES AND GAPS 
The profusion of national strategies does not adhere to the immutable principles 
of war.  In this respect they create seams of vulnerability which can be exploited by 
United States information-age opponents such as al Qaeda, as well as other nation states 
and non-state entities.  In his assessment of American grand strategy in the post-9/11 
world, Biddle outlines a number of terrorist threats to the Nation’s interests.137  When 
balanced against the multitude of overlapping and sometimes conflicting national 
strategies these threats expose a number of strategic weaknesses and gaps in the Nation’s 
approach to the War on Terror and beyond:   
 
1. Failure to Define the Nature of the War on Terror 
In September 2001, President Bush announced that the Nation was at war – and 
public statements since then have repeatedly and consistently echoed that formulation.  
Yet the Nation’s key strategic documents have continued to treat threats in the same 
generic, unspecific, peacetime-like sense that they had done prior to 2001.  Not until 
November, 2005 did the government publish its National Strategy for Victory in Iraq – 
more than two and a half years after it invaded Iraq.  Although they are only fronts in the 
larger effort, the American public has come to associate ongoing military operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq as representing the War on Terror.  No mention is made of the 
claim that in the time the United States has focused on defeating al Qaeda in these two 
countries, it (al Qaeda) has established or maintained its presence in ninety or more 
countries.138  Recent reductions in public support for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq 
illustrate a dangerous growing divide between the public and its government over the 
war.  If not addressed, this divide has the potential to erode the national will to fight and 
undermine the overall global effort in the War on Terror in a manner similar to Vietnam. 
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2. Failure to Define the Nature of the Enemy 
The lack of threat specificity when viewing terrorism as a methodology makes 
strategic thought difficult.  Conventional wartime strategy has traditionally concerned 
itself with identifying enemy weaknesses or centers of gravity and using military force to 
strike at them.  The issue becomes how to craft a strategy to exploit an asymmetrical 
enemy’s weaknesses without knowing who the enemy is, or even what means of war he 
will employ.  A war that encompasses literally any group using terrorist tactics becomes 
impossibly broad, engulfing a wide range of groups that includes those that pose no 
meaningful threat to the United States.   
In the War on Terror it becomes necessary therefore to distinguish between 
terrorism as a process and individual terrorist groups as entities.  Terrorism as a process 
includes phases which can be disrupted: ideological outreach; acquisition of funding, 
materiel, and support; recruitment; organization of efforts; indoctrination and training of 
personnel; planning and targeting; operations; and exploitation of results.139  When 
viewed as entities, different specifically targeted strategies are required to defeat 
individual terrorist groups dependent on whether their ideologies are rooted in political, 
economic, cultural, or special-interest origins.  Post et al identify the five principal 
terrorist group types as national-separatists, religious fundamentalists, other religious 
extremists (including non-traditional religious extremists), social revolutionaries, and 
right-wing extremist groups.140  Effective counter-terror strategies also must address the  
evolving philosophies, goals, strategies, tactics and operating environments of different 
terrorist groups, the evolution of al Qaeda from terrorist group to global insurgency being 
but one example. 
3. Failure to Define the Nature of the Objective 
For terrorism, the least ambitious goal might be containment, just to maintain the 
existing status quo for attacks against Americans – that is, to avoid letting the problem 
get any worse than it is already, and with little focus on non-American victims.  A more 
                                                 
139 Combating Terrorism: The Challenge of Measuring Effectiveness, Congressional Research 
Service Report for Congress.  Order Code RL33160, Library of Congress, November 23, 2005, 5. 
140 Jerrold M. Post, Keven G. Ruby, and Eric D. Shaw, “The Radical Group in Context: 1. An 
Integrated Framework for the Analysis of Group Risk for Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 
(Abingdon, UK: Taylor & Francis, 2002), 126. 
 79
ambitious goal would be the rollback of terrorism to pre-9/11 levels.  At the opposite 
extreme is elimination of all terrorism, of any kind, anywhere, against anyone.  No 
explicit or specific position has been laid down in national policy to establish whether 
containment, rollback, or elimination of terrorism constitute the Nation’s objective.  Yet 
official statements, and the proliferation of national strategies have implied extremely 
broad and poorly defined, albeit ambitious goals.   
More than four years after the attacks of 9/11 and the pronouncement of a War on 
Terror, metrics for performance related to clear and obtainable national objectives are 
largely lacking.  Measurements are inextricably linked to strategies.  However, while the 
goals of terrorist groups may be diametrically opposed to those of the United States, they 
may also be tangential in nature with each side achieving objectives and making progress 
according to their different measurement systems.  For instance, a reduction in terrorist 
attacks and resulting lessening of civilian casualties may indicate progress to friendly 
forces, but the terrorist group involved may have simply determined that further attacks 
are not currently needed because it has already achieved its political objectives.   
It remains an open question as to why al Qaeda has not followed its attacks of 9/11 with 
additional attacks on the United States.  The absence of attacks could be taken as an 
indicator of successful Homeland Security countermeasures implemented by the United 
States.  Another alternative could be that the 9/11 attacks allowed al Qaeda to accomplish 
its strategic objectives and it sees no need for further attacks on the United States at this 
time.  Uncertainty with respect to wartime strategies and measurements make it difficult 
to determine or to demonstrate progress.141 
 
4. Failure to Understand the Enemy’s Strategic Objectives 
Preemptive warfare against terrorism also imposes major economic costs.  It has 
been estimated that the 9/11 attacks cost al Qaeda less than $500,000.  In response, the 
United States has spent literally hundreds of billions of dollars – the precise amount is not 
known - for homeland security and homeland defense without any evidence that these 
                                                 
141 Combating Terrorism, 2. 
 80
expenditures have been cost-effective.142  Since 2001 the government has systematically 
failed to provide revenues sufficient to cover its costs.  Barring major changes in 
American fiscal policy, large, sustained expenditures for ongoing preemptive warfare can 
be expected to create corresponding increases in federal budget deficits.  Other things 
being equal, these economic consequences will hasten the loss of American primacy.  
This strategic failure plays directly into al Qaeda’s clearly enunciated strategic objective 
of bleeding the United States economy to wear down American political and public 
resolve.143  It has been suggested that in the War on Terror the United States is bleeding 
itself dry economically, similar to the way the Soviet Union did in its attempts to match 
western military spending during the Cold War.144 
 
5. Failure to Engage International Support  
The policies necessary to minimize the risk of great power competition tend to 
conflict with the requirements of energetic counterterrorism.  Multilateral restraint in the 
waging of war can clearly interfere with effectiveness of any given counter-terror 
campaign.  In Vietnam, the Johnson Administration limited its operations against North 
Vietnam out of fear of great power conflict with China or the Soviet Union.  Similarly, 
the Bush Administration saw the invasion of Iraq as central to its design for the War on 
Terror but its preferences have been clearly at odds with the interests of other great 
powers in the War on Terror.  Clearly, the majority of the other members of the Group of 
Eight world’s wealthiest industrial nations – Russia, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, 
Canada, and Britain – have not supported United States efforts in Iraq, with Britain being 
the primary exception.  Other nations, including China and many Muslim nations, have 
actively worked against United States efforts in Iraq.   
The experience of Spain illustrates the difficulties involved in holding together an 
international coalition of nations in the War on Terror.  The March 11, 2004, Madrid train 
bombings, strongly linked to Islamist groups and which killed 191 and wounded another 
1,460 people, created large-scale immediate reactions.  Occurring on the eve of Spanish                                                  
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national elections, the bombings led to spontaneous mass demonstrations, an upset 
victory by Spain’s socialist People’s Party over the ruling conservative Popular Party, 
and an immediate withdrawal of Spain’s military contingent from the United States-led 
coalition in Iraq.  
 
6. Failure to Address the Underlying Causes of Terrorism   
The key issue here is the relative importance of eliminating the underlying causes 
of terror.  As long as terrorism’s original motivations remain, it will likely never be 
possible to do more than suppress the threat at a still-virulent level.  The solution will be 
“full spectrum” warfare using all the elements of national power.  The causes of terrorism 
vary by the motivations and backgrounds of the groups involved, whether political, 
economic, cultural, or special interest.  In its simplest form terrorism is a method for the 
weak to fight the strong.  The response of the strong must be similarly unrestricted and 
ruthless.  It must consider not only the methods for confronting terrorist activities directly 
but simultaneously bringing the necessary social, political, economical, and technological 
force to bear against terrorism’s public and ideological support in order to prevent it from 
taking root again. 
 
7. Failure to Eliminate Strategic Ambiguity  
Four years of post-9/11 strategic debate have left America with a combination of 
ambition and ambiguity.  Although the costs of strategic ambiguity were relatively 
modest for the first two years of the War on Terror, the continuous military campaign in 
Iraq has increased the financial, human, and strategic costs of leaving basic choices 
unmade.  As a result of a rising tide of public dissatisfaction against the campaign in Iraq, 
resulting from increasing numbers of insurgent attacks, rising American casualties, rising 
costs, and a perceived lack of progress the National Security Council published its 
National Strategy For Victory in Iraq, nearly three years after the United States invaded 
the country.145  Much of it reads less as strategy than as justification for United States 
actions already completed, and more significantly, it does not address United States 
                                                 
145 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq.   
 82
strategy overall for victory in the War on Terror.  Perhaps the most important of these 
ambiguities concerns the end-state objective for countering terrorism.  Should the United 
States insist on reducing the terrorist threat to a level as close to eradication as it can 
manage, or should it tolerate greater terrorist violence as a quasi-permanent condition? 
The answer to this question implies the strategic alternatives of rollback, containment, or 
elimination. 
 
C. FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
ENVIRONMENT 
The United States must now compete in a world in which geography, military 
power, and time to react are no longer sufficient to guarantee its national security.  It 
must transform its strategic thinking from the two traditional models of “inside the box” 
thinking and “outside the box” thinking to incorporate a third alternative of “there is no 
box.”  The Cold War transformed the Nation’s national security structure during the 
period from the National Security Act of 1947, which reorganized the Department of 
Defense, to the final collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.  Over time, the United States 
and the Soviet Union came to resemble one another and both sides sought the assurance 
of stability to avoid either nuclear or conventional confrontation.  The struggle between 
the two superpowers took on the aspects of a ritualized dance, with highly routinized 
bureaucracy and predictability.   
The challenge for the United States now is to transcend the Industrial Age 
environment of the Cold War and engage its enemies in the Information Age 
environment in which the War on Terror is being waged, and in which Fifth Generation 
(unrestricted) Warfare (5GW) will be waged.  The Information Age has resulted in the 
death of routine and the elimination of geography and time as security buffers, and has  
ushered in the concept of unrestricted warfare, which incorporates the strategic thinking 





1. The Pace of Technological Change  
Technology and the capabilities of America’s new adversaries have been 
transforming at an exponential rate, at the speed of business, and according to the law of 
accelerating returns.  It is networking and transforming societies at an ever-increasing 
rate of speed and reducing the primacy of nation states.  Increasingly, as the locus of 
power shifts from industry to information lesser nation states, non-state entities, and even 
super-empowered individuals are acquiring the power and capabilities previously 
reserved to great power states.  The benefits and risks of this shift are available to friend 
and foe alike.    
United States transformation in the War on Terror, too often, has remained stalled 
at the speed of bureaucracy and doctrine, and remains fixated on the continued 
acquisition of high technology military weapons systems.  Technological change will 
elevate warfare to a level which is hard to conceive, beyond traditional military thinking 
– where today’s commonplace things may become tomorrow’s offensive and lethal 
means of waging war, and today’s lethal weapons systems will be rendered irrelevant.  If 
the United States is to capitalize on technological change and the change in behaviors it 
brings with it, it must expand its concept of weapons in order to avoid the military 
weapons technology trap described by Liang and Xiangsui, 
…the Americans have not been able to get their act together in this area.  This is 
because a new concept of weapons does not require relying on the springboard of 
new technology, it just demands lucid and incisive thinking.  However, this is not 
a strong point of the Americans, who are slaves to technology in their thinking.  
The Americans invariably halt their thinking at the boundary where technology 
has not yet reached. 
…the new concept of weapons is a view of weapons in the broad sense, which 
views as weapons all means which transcend the military realm but which can 
still be used in combat operations.  In its eyes, everything that can benefit 
mankind can also harm him.  That is to say that there is nothing in the world 
today that cannot become a weapon and this requires that our understanding of 
weapons must have an awareness that breaks through all boundaries.146 
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2. The Changing Nature of Threats  
Nation-states and future peer competitors are no longer the only concern, and 
perhaps not the immediate primary concern, of the United States.  As a result of its 
overwhelming success in Gulf War I (Iraq, 1991) and Gulf War II (Iraq, 2003), it is not 
likely that the United States will face another nation capable or willing to wage 
successful nuclear or conventional Third Generation (maneuver) Warfare (3GW) against 
it.  Instead, threats from both state and non-state entities, those capable of waging Fourth 
Generation (insurgency) Warfare (4GW) and Fifth Generation (unrestricted) Warfare 
(5GW) must be considered the primary threat in the post-modern era of warfare.  The 
ability of the Nation to achieve victory in the War on Terror and beyond will depend 
fundamentally on the ability of American strategy to adjust and adapt to changes in the 
nature and character of its adversaries.147  Indeed, in the quote from Unrestricted 
Warfare: China’s Master Plan to Destroy America at the beginning of this chapter, Liang 
and Xiangsui indicate that the threat may literally come from any direction, armed or 
non-armed force, military or non-military, lethal or non-lethal. 
 
3. The Changing Nature of Peace 
The effects of globalization, the Internet, and interconnected economies, once 
cited as forces for integration and stability, are also creating a world of extremes.  The 
new security paradigm that is emerging does not lead to a safer world.  In a world made 
smaller, competition and conflict between interest blocs are inevitable.  They will occur 
as a result of differences over culture, competition for scarce resources, and competition 
for supremacy.  As Kaplan states in The Coming Anarchy, “The peace we think we have 
is only an interregnum before another cycle of conflict.”148  In the new strategic reality 
which it confronts, the United States may never see another period of uninterrupted 
peace. 
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4. The Changing Nature of Warfare  
Fifth Generation (unrestricted) Warfare (5GW) will change the face of war in 
ways never before seen.  Network-centric warfare, with effects-based operations 
characterized by shorter decision cycles and swifter reaction times, and closer integration 
of information/intelligence and operations offers a step toward the transformation the 
Nation must make to interagency interoperability if it is to be able to defeat terrorists 
groups with indistinct centers of gravity and thereby win the War on Terror.  Achieving 
victory in the War on Terror will take decades, but the Nation does not have the luxury of 
making the war its sole focus.  Terrorism represents simply one form of Fifth Generation 
(unrestricted) Warfare (5GW).  Both the definition of war and its means and methods will 
expand exponentially.  An indication of things to come can be taken from Unrestricted 
Warfare: China’s Master Plan to Destroy America.  Liang and Xiangsui indicate how 
Fifth Generation (unrestricted) Warfare (5GW) will go far beyond Clausewitz’ accepted 
definition of war, 
…the new principles of war are no longer “using armed force to compel the 
enemy to submit to one’s will,” but rather are “using all means, including armed 
force or non-armed force, military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal to 
compel the enemy to accept one’s interest.”149 
This Chinese definition of war represents a fundamental expansion of the means 
and methods of war great enough to create a dialectically qualitative advantage over 
Fourth Generation (insurgent) Warfare (4GW).  Liang and Xiangsui describe the forms it 
will take as shown in Table 5.  Significantly, the application of Fifth Generation 
(unrestricted) Warfare (5GW) will not be limited to the weak against the strong.  With the 
demise of both nuclear and conventional warfare, unrestricted warfare will be practiced 
by both the weak and the strong, both nation states and non-state entities, against one 
another.  It will achieve the true embodiment of strategic thinking represented by the 
concept that “there is no box.” 
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Forms of Fifth Generation (unrestricted) Warfare (5GW) 
Financial Warfare Entering and subverting banking and stock markets and manipulating the 
value of a targeted currency. 
Smuggling Warfare Sabotaging a rival country’s economy by flooding its markets with illegal 
goods and pirated products. 
Cultural Warfare Influencing the cultural biases of a targeted country by imposing one’s 
own viewpoints. 
Drug Warfare Flooding illicit drugs across national borders and breaking down the fabric 
of a society through their use. 
Media and Fabrication 
Warfare 
Manipulating foreign media, either by compromising or intimidating 
journalists, or getting access to another country’s airwaves and imposing 
one’s own national perspectives. 
Technological Warfare Gaining monopolistic control of or having a particular edge in particular 
vital technologies that can be used in both peace and wartime. 
Resources Warfare Gaining control of scarce natural resources and being able to control or 
manipulate their access and market value. 
Psychological Warfare Imposing one’s own national interests by dominating a rival nation’s 
perceptions of its own strengths and weaknesses. 
Network Warfare Dominating or subverting transnational information systems. 
International Law Warfare Joining international or multinational organizations in order to subvert 
their policies and the interpretation of legal rulings. 
Environmental Warfare Weakening or subjugating a rival nation by despoiling or altering its 
natural environment. 
Economic Aid Warfare Controlling a targeted country through aid dependency. 
 
Table 5. Forms of Fifth Generation (unrestricted) Warfare (5GW) 150 
 
5. The Changing Nature of Force   
In his definition of war as “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will” 
Clausewitz considered only the application of physical military force in order to achieve 
political objectives.  His embracement of military force as the primary force in war was 
appropriate to the modern era of war in which On War was written and held true for 170 
years, but it falls short in the post-modern era of war.  The Liang and Xiangsui definition 
of war as “using all means, including armed force or non-armed force, military and non-
military, and lethal and non-lethal to compel the enemy to accept one’s interest” is a 
quantum change in the concept of force.151  It also implies a dynamic change in the 
obstacles to the generation of force.  Military force will be but one form of force in post-
modern war, and rarely the most significant. 
 
                                                 
150 Liang and Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, xii. 
151 Ibid., xxii. 
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6. The Changing National Security Strategy  
Strategy derives from political objectives.  As a result of the new threat 
environment the United States can no longer rely on a reactive posture as it has in the 
past, but must develop a campaign plan for the strategic offensive in the post-modern era 
in which it finds itself.  In American Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment Biddle 
offers two policy options for the United States in the War on Terror:  either the mid-term 
rollback of terrorism to pre-9/11 levels, or the near-term containment of terrorism at 
existing levels.152  He does not consider the elimination of terrorism as an option nor, 
given the long history of terrorism, is it likely that such an outcome is possible in the near 
term.  Neither does Biddle, nor any of the current proliferation of national strategies, 
consider American grand strategy in light of 5th Generation (unlimited) Warfare (5GW).  
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America introduced the policy of 
preemptive actions to defeat direct terrorist threats to the United States but it stops short 
of considering actions beyond the disruption of terrorism.153  If it is to maintain its 
position of hegemony in the world the United States must develop political, social, 
economic, and military objectives and strategy in the form of grand strategy or a master 
plan that is in line with the post-modern era.   
 
7. The Changing Nature of Information and Intelligence 
Information Age dynamics are changing the nature of and the distinction between 
information and intelligence, as well as its impact on consumers.  The increasing volume 
of unprocessed information, the speed of its transmission, and its near-instantaneous 
availability to a global audience by multiple means – visual, audio, print, cyber – give it 
both advantages and liabilities.  The first information to reach an intended audience 
shapes its perception.154  Given the proposition that the War on Terror, and the Fifth 
Generation (unrestricted) Warfare (5GW) to follow are “wars of ideas,” to be forced to 
react to information will be tantamount to losing.   
                                                 
152 Biddle, “American Grand Strategy After 9/11,” 28. 
153 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 5. 
154 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Washington, D.C. (September 2004), 38. 
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The paradox for the United States is that its enemies are successfully operating in 
an environment of free and open information flows.  The availability to unlimited 
consumers of vast amounts of open source information will enable them to compete with 
the intelligence community in the “knowledge” business.  It is likely that consumers of 
processed intelligence will question its value when so much unprocessed information is 
available, but faster and free of security classifications and other rules.155  If the 
intelligence community is to compete it must adapt and take into account the expectations 
of intelligence consumers.   
As a result of 9/11, the number of intelligence consumers at the federal, state, 
local, tribal, and private levels has increased exponentially.  Their decision windows are 
not open for long and they require useful information in a rapid fashion.  They must be 
assimilated into the mix of traditional intelligence consumers.  Increasingly, the public 
will also take on the aspects of an intelligence consumer.  Given the vast amounts of 
unprocessed information available, and the focus on the “war of ideas” to maintain or 
defeat the national will to fight, strategies for war must increasingly focus on the impacts 
of information on public perceptions. 
 
8. The Changing Nature of Societies 
The ongoing changes in the national security environment discussed thus far will 
transform societies and redefine them in the form of communities held together by 
culture and common interests rather than geographic boundaries.  The impact of the pace 
of technological change, and changes in the nature of threats, peace, warfare, force, and 
information may lead to the development of community clusters held together by self-
interest, although they may not necessarily be enlightened or democratic in nature.156  
Instead, the motivation of communities is more likely to be driven by imperatives similar 
to those identified by Barber in Jihad vs. McWorld:  market imperatives which erode 
national societies and give rise to non-state entities; resource imperatives under which all 
                                                 
155 RAND Corp., Toward a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs, 2005, 18.  
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR242/index.html (accessed 03/13/06)  
156 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Originally published 1835), (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2000), 647. 
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nations need something another nation has, and some nations have almost nothing they 
need; information technology imperatives which lend themselves to surveillance as well 
as liberty; and ecological imperatives driven by the impact of globalization on 
ecology.157  As these imperatives clash with nationalism in various regions of the world, 
Barber predicts that they will lead to re-tribalization of large swaths of mankind.  
Regardless, the information age will bring about the inevitable diminishment of societies 
and the rise of communities in new, unimagined forms. 
 
9. Expectations of the American Public 
Victory in the War on Terror, and the security of the Nation in the Fifth 
Generation (unrestricted) Warfare (5GW) to follow, will be dependent on the perceptions 
and expectations of the American Public.  The visual media images of the attacks of 9/11 
were seared into the Nation’s psyche.  Immediate public outrage was initially followed by 
a process of national unification which, over time, has taken on aspects of war weariness 
and disillusionment with the ongoing military operations in Iraq.  Although it expects 
short-term success, the American public must be candidly, even brutally, informed and 
prepared for the new strategic reality facing the Nation for the next thirty to fifty years. 
 
D. TOWARD A GRAND STRATEGY  
The question of what the Nation should do to win the War on Terror and prepare 
for Fifth Generation (unrestricted) Warfare (5GW) looms.  The answer requires national 
objectives and a grand strategic offensive writ large on a global scale.  In conjunction 
with the new strategic reality that the United States finds itself in, its strategy must be one 
of protracted and continuous effort.  It will not be enough simply to achieve victory in 
Iraq, or even to defeat terrorism.  Instead, grand strategy in the form of a master plan is 
required, one which will require an expanded and enlightened application of Clausewitz’ 
first strategic principle: to define the true nature of the war and not mistake it for 
something else.  
                                                 
157 Benjamin R. Barber, “Jihad vs. McWorld,” in Globalization and the Challenges of a New Century 
(Bloomington, Indiana, Indiana University Press, 2000), 23. 
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The nature of war to come will be Fifth Generation (unrestricted) Warfare (5GW) 
with terrorism as a component.  It will be conducted throughout the information age 
social, information, cognitive, and physical domains.  Its methods will be asymmetrical 
and its means will include nation states, non-state entities, and even super-empowered 
individuals.  Over time, the United States must transform its definition of war, to include 
all the means of force – both military and non-military, until it matches that of its 
enemies.  The forms of warfare it employs must be unrestricted and must reflect the 
Nation’s ruthless self-interest.  Failure to do so will have grave strategic consequences for 
the United States, to include gradual but inevitable decline from its current position of 
global leadership. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS – A WAY AHEAD 
“Our challenge in this new century is a difficult one.  It's really to prepare to defend our 
nation against the unknown, the uncertain and what we have to understand will be the 
unexpected.  That may seem on the face of it an impossible task, but it is not.” 
−Donald Rumsfeld (2002)158 
 
“If you do not change, you can become extinct.” 
−Spencer Johnson (1998)159 
 
In the information age, the United States is at a juncture that will severely test its 
political and public will, and will set the terms and quality of its future existence.  As a 
result of its new strategic reality, it finds itself engaged in three simultaneous ongoing 
Fourth Generation (insurgency) Warfare (4GW) conflicts: in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and 
against the global insurgency being waged by al Qaeda.  At the same time, it must 
prepare for the Fifth Generation (unrestricted) Warfare (5GW) conflict that is emerging.  
The fundamental changes in the national security environment described in Chapter IV 
will change the essential definition of what constitutes war, as well as the definition of 
force and its application in order to achieve victory.  The result will be a fully 
interdisciplinary threat and an omnipresent battlespace, far exceeding modern 
conventional military threats, and which requires an adaptive capabilities-based response.  
Against this new strategic reality, the nation has the preponderance of its military 
force and strategy developed around and focused on Third Generation (maneuver) 
Warfare (3GW).  The proliferation of national strategies has resulted in an approach to 
the War on Terror that is diffused.  It has made no declarations of war, thereby leaving its 
objectives and its intentions unclear.  Despite public reassurances by the current 
administration concerning relative success in the conflict in Iraq and the War on Terror 
overall, there are numerous indicators of waning public support for operations in Iraq that 
are reminiscent of the loss of public support that led to defeat in the Vietnam War. 
                                                 
158 Donald Rumsfeld, remarks presented on “21st Century Transformation of the U.S. Armed Forces.”  
159 Spencer Johnson, MD, Who Moved My Cheese? (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1998), 46. 
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The nature of the engagement in the War on Terror – clarity of objectives and 
strategic offensive to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative – remains to be 
accomplished.  Thus far the United States has established three significant efforts in 
waging the War on Terror.  First, it has spent literally hundreds of billions of dollars since 
9/11 on homeland security to prevent further terrorist attacks.  Outside of expenditures on 
military efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, most of the money spent on homeland security 
constitutes “preparation for war,” rather than conduct of “war proper” that will lead 
directly to defeat of the Nation’s enemies.  Second, since 9/11 a great deal of effort has 
also been expended on government reorganization, including the establishment of the 
Department of Homeland Security, the standup of United States Northern Command 
within the Department of Defense, and reorganization of the Nation’s intelligence 
network.  These efforts will take many years to come to full fruition.  Finally, the 
ongoing transformation within the Department of Defense has primarily focused on the 
acquisition and application of technology to leverage Third Generation (maneuver) 
Warfare (3GW) network-centric capabilities and thereby overcome obstacles to the 
generation of force.  Technology can always be used to achieve greater network-
centricity in maneuver warfare capabilities using existing  military forces, equipment, and 
tactics, but it is unlikely that these improved capabilities alone will be able to overcome 
the dialectical advantages of Fourth Generation (insurgent) Warfare (4GW) and Fifth 
Generation (unrestricted) Warfare (5GW). 
Reorganization – the simple reordering of existing elements of government 
agencies and efforts – is not enough to win the War on Terror and prepare for the 
ascendancy of Fifth Generation (unrestricted) Warfare (5GW).  To achieve true 
transformation – to metamorphose into an entirely new form and function and overcome 
obstacles to the generation of force in the information age – will require the United States 
to adopt a Fifth Generation (unrestricted) Warfare (5GW) styled offensive strategy.   
This degree of transformation can be accomplished by accepting the Department 
of Defense network-centric concept of war as a building block foundation.  This 
foundation can be adapted to incorporate interagency interoperability for a true 
interdisciplinary capability with existing resources, and to dictate the nature and tempo of 
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the engagement.  Faced with infinite enemy capabilities, but finite resources to counter 
them, the next step will be to expand the current physical and cyber global commons to 
include the conceptual commons of the information age, and thereby redefine the nature 
of the environment.  This will allow the development of new concepts and an adaptive 
capabilities-based approach to warfare that is characterized by the advantages of infinite 
capabilities, rather than the limitations of finite resources.  Finally, it will be necessary to 




The premise of this approach is that terrorist groups are not invincible.  In fact, 
their structures and operations can be very fragile and are certainly capable of being 
defeated.  Further, concepts for defeating terrorist groups are universal; they can be 
applied to national, transnational, and international terrorist groups and they can be made 
to transcend terrorist group ideologies.  However, it is necessary to move away from the 
inductive approach of the Cold War – looking for weaknesses, gaps, and deficiencies, and 
determining how to correct them; and toward deductive thinking and adaptive 
capabilities-based planning in the War on Terror – a conscious search for the unexpected 
and the bounds of feasibility.160  This requires moving from the current Third Generation 
(maneuver) Warfare (3GW) approach to a Fifth Generation (unrestricted) Warfare (5GW) 
approach.  By borrowing from both traditional and emerging strategies, operations, and 
tactics of the Department of Defense, and adapting them to all the elements of national 
power, it is possible to relegate terrorist groups to their proper perspective as threats and 
defeat them accordingly.  Key tenets of this approach are: 
Terrorist groups exist and must operate in the military concept of battlespace, just 
as the United States and any other adversary.  Battlespace is a multi-dimensional concept 
that traditionally includes the air, land, sea, space, and cyber domains; enemy and 
friendly forces, facilities, weather, terrain, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the 
                                                 
160 Cebrowski, “Transformation and the Changing Character of War,” 2. 
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information environment.161  Following military concepts of war, any adversary that 
exists and operates in battlespace can be engaged and defeated.   
Terrorist groups have centers of gravity that can be disrupted, defeated, or 
destroyed.  Clausewitz called an adversary’s center of gravity “the hub of all power and 
movement, on which everything depends; it is the point against which all our energies 
should be directed.”162  Current United States military doctrine considers centers of 
gravity to be the sources of power from which an adversary derives its freedom of action 
or will to fight.163   
Terrorist groups, as fragile organizations, have a limited number of asymmetrical 
options available to them, primarily the threat or application of armed force.  By 
comparison, the United States, as a result of sheer size, has an almost infinite number of 
asymmetrical options to counter terrorist groups across all the elements of national 
power, including not only military armed force but also diplomatic, social, information, 
economic, and law enforcement options.  The key to success for the United States is to 
bring to bear all its elements of national power to defeat foes that are both resilient and 
adaptive. 
Transformation from industrial age methods to information age methods is 
essential to long-term success in the War on Terror.  The emergence of al Qaeda as the 
likely forerunner of terrorist groups in the information age will drive transformation:  
industrial age concepts of battlespace must be transformed into information age domains 
of conflict – physical, information, cognitive, and social – and concepts of traditional 
centers of gravity must be transformed into critical systems, nodes, and links in order to 




                                                 
161 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, Operations (2001), 4-20. 
162 Clausewitz, On War, 595-596. 
163 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-0.  Doctrine for Joint Operations (2001).  III-22. 
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B. SYNOPSIS OF THE CENTRAL IDEA 
1. The Current Operational Paradigm 
The current Department of Defense operational paradigm in Figure 6 is a Third 
Generation (maneuver) Warfare (3GW) approach that evolved from the experience of the 
United States military during the industrial-scale wars of the twentieth century.  It is 
rooted in industrial age concepts that focus on conventional, symmetrical threats and 
responses, and hierarchical command and control.  It is geography-based across territory 
and space.  Its standard for defending the United States against external threats is a 
layered defense across the operational domains that comprise the Industrial Age global 
commons – the land, air, maritime, cyber, and space domains. 
This paradigm is based on the concept that an active layered and comprehensive 
defense is necessary if the United States is to detect, deter, prevent, and defeat threats as 
early and as far from United States borders as possible; and, if necessary recover from 
them when they do occur.  In Figure 6 the forward regions are sovereign areas outside the 
United States, the approaches are conceptual regions based on situation-specific 
intelligence, and the homeland includes the continental United States, its territories and 
possessions.  Its primary weakness is that it presumes that attacks will emanate from 
outside the homeland and be conducted in a conventional manner.  It forces acceptance 
that military force will always be the first line of defense. 
The operational seam of vulnerability in a layered defense of the United States is 
most pronounced in the divide between the homeland and its approaches.  Outside the 
homeland, the Department of Defense clearly has the lead for defending the Nation.  
Inside the homeland, the responsibilities are not quite so clear, and either the Department 
of Defense or the Department of Homeland Security can have the lead for defending the 
Nation, depending on the situation.  Significantly, this construct can be adapted for taking 
either the strategic defensive or the strategic offensive against conventional enemies, but 
it retains a conceptual seam of vulnerability since it is not designed for or capable of 
defeating adversaries that employ methods of Fourth Generation (insurgent) Warfare 
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Figure 6.   The Current Operational Paradigm164 
 
 
2. The Transformation Canvas 
The strategic warfare transformation canvas shown in Figure 7 was adapted from 
Kim and Mauborgne in Blue Ocean Strategy: How to Create Uncontested Market Space 
and Make the Competition Irrelevant.165  It uses business concepts on strategy to 
illustrate the premise, advanced by Cebrowski in Transformation and the Changing 
Character of War, that concepts of war are evolving and adapting at the speed of business 
while homeland security and homeland defense in the United States continues to evolve 
at the speed of doctrine.166  It demonstrates the transformation of warfare that must occur 
                                                 
164 Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (2005). 
http://www.dod.gov/news/Jun2005/d20050630homeland.pdf  (accessed 02/09/06). 
165 W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne,  Blue Ocean Strategy: How to Create Uncontested Market 
Space and Make the Competition Irrelevant  (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Publishing 
Corporation, 2005), 25. 
166 Cebrowski, “Transformation and the Changing Character of War,” 6.   
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from industrial age, symmetrical Third Generation (maneuver) Warfare (3GW) to 
information age Fourth Generation (insurgent) Warfare (4GW) and Fifth Generation 
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Figure 7.   The Strategic Warfare Transformation Canvas167 
 
The strategic warfare transformation canvas also shows change in the operational 
domains of warfare, from the industrial age global commons - represented by the land,  
air, maritime, space, and cyber domains, to the information age global commons 
represented by the physical, information, cognitive, and social domains.  Information age 
domains are defined as:168 
                                                 
167 Kim and Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy, 25. 
168 Department of Defense, Office of Force Transformation, Implementation of Network-Centric 
Warfare, 20.   
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• Physical Domain – the traditional domain of warfare where a force is 
moved through time and space.  It spans the land, sea, air, and space 
environments where military forces execute operations. 
• Information Domain – the domain where information is created, 
manipulated, and shared. 
• Cognitive Domain – the domain where intent, doctrine, tactics, techniques, 
and procedures reside.  It is the domain where decisive concepts and 
tactics emerge. 
• Social Domain – comprises the necessary elements of any human 
enterprise.  It is where humans interact, exchange information, form 
shared awareness and understandings, and make collaborative decisions.  
It is also the domain of culture, values, attitudes, and beliefs, and where 
political decisions are made. 
In the industrial age, large and small powers compete for the same thing – 
conventional military supremacy in the physical domains.  Relative advantage or 
disadvantage is a matter of the amount of resources and control of available knowledge.  
However, significant advantage can be gained in conventional warfare in the physical 
domains through the application of network-centric concepts and operations. 
Al Qaeda, as a forerunner of terrorist groups and non-state entities in the 
information age, rejects the logic of trying to compete with conventional military forces.  
As a non-state entity it lacks the necessary resources to employ Third Generation 
(maneuver) Warfare (3GW) methods.  Instead, it redefines the problem and seeks to 
make the competition irrelevant by establishing a new paradigm for competition in the 
form of either Fourth Generation (insurgent) Warfare (4GW) or Fifth Generation 
(unrestricted) Warfare (5GW).  In so doing, it tries to avoid conventional warfare in the 
physical domain – land, sea, air, and space – but seeks instead to gain asymmetrical 
advantage in the information, cognitive, and social domains. 
The information age will see the end of conventional warfare.  The overwhelming 
battlefield successes of United States have brought the era of large-scale maneuver 
warfare to a close by illustrating its limitations.  The reaction in many corners of the 
world is that there are no nations remaining that are capable of sustaining the costs of 
competing with the United States in conventional warfare.169  Instead of relying on 
                                                 
169 Liang and Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, xix. 
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military force to wage war, strong and weak nations alike will find other ways to wage 
war, in other domains, by employing versions of Fourth Generation (insurgent) Warfare 
(4GW) or Fifth Generation (unrestricted) Warfare (5GW).  Further, this development will 
not be limited to nation states, but will also be available to non-state entities, as well as 
super-empowered individuals and groups.   
Figure 7 indicates that all will be able to acquire infinite capabilities and compete 
equally in the information age domains.  However, the United States can retain 
significant advantage by expanding network-centric operations to encompass interagency 
interoperability across all the domains.  This will allow the United States to bring to bear 
all the elements of its national power, and again take advantage of its superior resources 
and concepts to defeat entities such as al Qaeda. 
 
3. The Emerging Operational Paradigm 
The emerging DOD operational paradigm shown in Figure 8 is a network-centric 
approach based on the understanding that a fundamental shift of power has occurred from 
industry to information.  It is rooted in information age concepts that focus on non-
conventional, asymmetrical threats and responses, and non-hierarchical command and 
control.  It expands beyond the geographical base of territory and space.  Its standard for 
defending the United States against both internal and external threats is a universal 
networked defense across the operational domains that comprise the information age 
global commons – the physical, information, cognitive, and social domains.  Network-
centric operations seek to create an information advantage and translate it into an 
operational advantage.  It accepts that military force may be neither the first nor the most 
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Figure 8.   The Emerging Operational Paradigm170 
 
The concept of network-centric operations, as adapted from the Department of 
Defense and applied to interagency interoperability, however, is not simply about 
technology, per se; it is also about behavior.  The idea is to feed information as quickly as 
possible to leaders and operators in affected areas so they can make better-informed 
decisions about what, when, and how to respond to threats.  In contrast to traditional 
operations that are agency-specific, network-centric operations focus on passing 
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as a whole to respond to threats.  The tenets of network-centric operations, from The 
Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare, that carryover directly to interagency 
operability are:171 
• Robustly networking agencies improves information sharing. 
• Information sharing and collaboration enhances the quality of information 
and shared situational awareness. 
• Shared situational awareness enables self-synchronization, and enhances 
speed of decision-making and response. 
• These in turn dramatically increase operational effectiveness. 
 
4. An Adaptive Capabilities-Based Approach 
An adaptive capabilities-based approach, if used correctly, can be applied directly 
to Fifth Generation (unrestricted) Warfare (5GW).  As a result of its dialectic advantage, 
it can also be used to defeat terrorist groups that employ Fourth Generation (insurgent) 
Warfare (4GW) techniques and strategies.  Its concept carries within it the nucleus for 
success in the War on Terror. 
Adaptive capabilities-based planning and operations require a system-of-systems 
understanding of the strategic operating environment – the battlespace.  Once an 
objective is established, a more specific analysis can be conducted to determine the 
interconnectivity of key systems, nodes, and links across the physical, information, 
cognitive, and social domains as shown in Figure 9.  Nodes may be persons, places, or 
physical things.  Links are the behavioral, physical, or functional relationships between 
nodes. 
Nodal analysis allows the development of desirable effects coupled to nodes and 
links, identification of actions to be applied to the nodes and links to achieve the desired 
effects, and allocation of resources, drawing from all the elements of national power to 
perform the necessary actions.  Emphasis must be placed on a multi-disciplinary 
understanding and approach to both the environment and the engagement.  The result will 
be virtually unlimited capability across the environment – the omnipresent battlespace –
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far exceeding modern conventional military capabilities, and which overcomes the 
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Figure 9.   An Adaptive Capabilities-Based Approach172 
 
5. A Counter-terror Practical Example 
Adaptive capabilities-based planning and operations, applied to Fifth Generation 
(unrestricted) Warfare (5GW), can be used to defeat any adversary, including terrorist 
groups.  It is not limited to any particular type of terrorist group, but can be applied 
equally to defeat any of the five types of groups identified by Post et al – national-
separatists, religious fundamentalists, other religious extremists (including non-traditional  
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religious extremists), social revolutionaries, and right-wing extremist groups.  Figure 10 
illustrates a practical application of the concept to defeat a terrorist group using al Qaeda 
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Figure 10.   An Adaptive Capabilities-Based Approach to Defeating al Qaeda 
 
The lines between the four main elements of the model – the government, the 
terrorist group, the target audience, and the victim – represent the various systems, links, 
and nodes that connect them.  They are illustrative only, and there are certainly more 
possibilities than are shown for this example.  The dotted line between the target 
audience and the victim in the model represents the media in all its forms – print, TV, 
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radio, Internet, and so on.  The green, red, and blue starbursts represent nodes where risk 
communications, strategic communications (public diplomacy), or unrestricted force can 
be applied to achieve desired effects.   
If risk communications and strategic communications are applied to the media 
links and nodes between the target audience and the victim it is possible to expose al 
Qaeda (or any other group) to the target audience for what they really are.  Through the 
application of risk communications and strategic communications, the al Qaeda message 
to the target audience can be defeated.  The challenge is to identify the links and nodes to 
be influenced, determine the desired effect, and apply the necessary means (positive or 
negative force) to them in order to attain the desired effect. 
 
6. The Application of Metrics 
As stated above, wartime strategy derives from political objectives.  It follows 
that progress in achieving objectives must also be measured.  Tables 6, 7, 8, and 9 
provide a template for the development of metrics to be used to assess progress in the 
War on Terror.  Assessments of resources allocated, and development of metrics for 
outputs and outcomes of network-centric interagency interoperability, must be developed.  
These should measure inputs in the form of resources allocated, outputs in the form of 
changes in individual and agency behaviors, intermediate outcomes in the form 
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Attributes for Application of Metrics 
 
Inputs (Resources)  
 
Assessments of resources allocated against 
diplomatic, information, economic, military, and 
law enforcement options. 
• Preparations for war. 




• Amount of dollars spent. 
• Amount of materiel resources allocated. 
• Numbers of staff dedicated. 
• Degree of improvements made (e.g. 
facilities hardened). 
• Degree of planning conducted. 
• Number of operations conducted. 
 
 





Attributes for Application of Metrics 
 
Outputs (Products & Services) 174  
 
Assessments of the tenets of network-centric 
operations against interagency interoperability: 
• Robustly networked agencies 
(organizational structures). 
• Information sharing. 
• Common operational picture. 
• Shared situational awareness. 
• Enhanced operational effectiveness. 
 
Product Measures 175 
• Quality of networking:  Degree of 
networking, agility, net readiness of nodes. 
• Quality of organic information. 
• Degree of information “shareability.” 
• Quality of individual information. 
• Quality of individual sensemaking: 
Individual awareness, individual 
understanding, individual decisions. 
• Quality of interactions:  Top level, 
organization characteristics, individual 
characteristics, organizational and 
individual behaviors. 
• Degree of shared information. 
• Degree of shared sensemaking:  Shared 
awareness, shared understanding, 
collaborative decisions. 
• Degree of decision/synchronization: Plans 
synchronized, entities synchronized. 
• Degree of effectiveness. 
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Attributes for Application of Metrics 
 
Intermediate Outcomes   
 
Assessments of derivative 
outcomes from diplomatic, 
information, economic, military, 
and law enforcement actions. 
 
Strategic 
• Capture/elimination of identified terrorist leaders. 
• Neutralization of terrorist political/diplomatic alliances. 
• Alleviation of the social roots of terrorism. 
• Increases in literacy in Islamist regions. 
• Increases in individual freedoms in Islamist regions. 
• Neutralization of economic policies that support terrorism. 
• Elimination of multilateral support of terrorism. 
• Reduction of public and ideological support of terrorism. 
• Disruption of terrorist strategic planning. 
Operational 
• Destruction/neutralization of terrorist means of command 
and control. 
• Prevention/neutralization of terrorist technology acquisition. 
• Elimination of terrorist financial support. 
• Elimination of terrorist shelter/safe haven. 
• Elimination of terrorist training camps. 
• Reduction/elimination of terrorist recruiting. 
• Reduction in enrollment in radical Islamist schools. 
Tactical 
• Elimination of terrorist capability to “shoot,” move, and 
communicate. 
• Reductions in illegal alien border crossings. 
• Apprehensions of known terrorists. 
• Dismantling of terrorist cells and networks. 
 




Attributes for Application of Metrics 
 
End Outcomes 176 
 
Strategic Outcome #1:  Rollback of terrorism to pre-
9/11 levels, characterized by ambitious goals to 
destroy it, higher immediate costs, and higher near-
term risk but lower long-term risk. 
 
Strategic Outcome #2:  Containment of terrorism to 
current levels, characterized by more limited goals of 
prevention, lower immediate costs, and lower near-
term risk but persistent long-term risk. 
 
Strategic Outcome #3:  Complete elimination of 
terrorism.  
Political Policy and Strategic Decisions 
 
• Qualitative decisions. 
• Not subject to application of metrics. 
 
 
Table 9. Application of Metrics – End Outcomes 
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C. SUPPORTING RECOMMENDATIONS 
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the United States finds itself facing a 
new strategic reality.  In the information age, war is the norm and periods of peace will 
be the exception.  The Nation must win the three Fourth Generation (insurgency) Warfare 
(4GW) conflicts in which it is currently engaged:  in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and the global 
insurgency being waged by al Qaeda.  Simultaneously, it must transform itself and its 
efforts to win the larger War on Terror and prepare for the Fifth Generation (unrestricted) 
Warfare (5GW) which will follow it.  The following strategic recommendations are made 
to resolve the issues identified in this thesis, eliminate strategic ambiguity, and shape the 
framework for transformation in the War on Terror. 
The United States must clearly define the nature of the War on Terror as total war, 
thereby achieving Clausewitz’ dictum to not mistake it for something else.  In Korea and 
Vietnam, the Nation failed to learn the lessons of attempting to fight wars of limited 
objectives.  The War on Terror must be approached as total war, as the application of all 
the elements of national power against information age enemies that are also waging total 
war.   
The enemy in the War on Terror must be clearly defined.  It is not the generic 
concepts of “terror” or “terrorism,” nor is it solely the insurgencies in Afghanistan and 
Iraq.  Al Qaeda is likely only the forerunner of what is to come.  Specific groups and non-
state entities that pose threats to United States interests, and the wider interests of the 
greater global community, must be identified in the same manner as hostile nations.  No 
limitation should be placed on whether the specific enemies are national or transnational, 
foreign or domestic – all must be treated as information age networks capable of harming 
the United States and its interests. 
United States objectives in the larger War on Terror must be clearly defined using 
measurable criteria.  Establishment of “democracy” should not be an objective.  Instead, a 
security framework should be constructed for other nations and cultures to achieve 
prosperity and self-determination so that democratic reforms can follow.  To do this will 
require ruthless strategic objectivity.   
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The United States Congress should issue a global declaration of war to demystify 
the Nation’s intent in the War on Terror and establish its objectives for the World to see.  
This would have two distinct advantages.  First, it would establish members of hostile 
nations, listed terrorist groups, or non-state entities as enemy combatants and eliminate 
their possible access as criminals to the protections of the Nation’s legal system.  It would 
allow them to be pursued and defeated without recourse, using all the elements of 
national power – political, diplomatic, social, economic, military, law enforcement.  It 
would also establish up front the political and public will for conducting the War on 
Terror, which can then be further sustained by future success. 
Those activities that are “preparations for war” should be separated from activities 
that constitute “war proper” and lead to direct defeat of the Nation’s enemies.  The 
national strategy for the War on Terror should encompass both a defensive and an 
offensive capability.  Although they are essential from a defensive standpoint, activities 
such as reorganization of government, critical infrastructure protection, and scenario-
based planning at the state and local level are mitigating strategies.  They will not lead to 
direct defeat of al Qaeda or any other adversary but, unfortunately, they have received the 
majority of national homeland security focus.  The elements of national power – political, 
diplomatic, social, economic, military, law enforcement – should be employed in a 
strategic offensive manner to defeat or destroy the Nation’s enemies. 
A single, unified, national security strategy should be developed that would 
eliminate the proliferation of national strategies, and fuse the often competing concepts of 
homeland security and homeland defense into one.  The current multitude of competing 
stand-alone national strategies should be de-conflicted and subordinated to a single over-
arching strategy for national security.  Concurrently, the strategic gap that currently exists 
between the Department of Homeland Security (homeland security) and the Department 
of Defense (homeland defense) should be eliminated or bridged.  One or the other must 
be given the lead for national security, or formal protocols should be mandated to direct 
their collaboration on both strategic defense and strategic offense in the War on Terror. 
The potential for unintended consequences, those that play to the strategic 
objectives of the nation’s enemies in the War on Terror, must be minimized.  This will 
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require a greater understanding of the nature of the war, the nature of the enemy, and 
differences between cultures, as well as a fuller appreciation that the war also 
encompasses the social, information, and cognitive domains of conflict − in addition to 
the physical domain.  In the War on Terror it is possible to win the conflicts in the 
physical domain through use of military force, but lose the conflicts in the social and 
information domains and thereby lose the overall war.  In Vietnam, the United States won 
every physical battle it fought at the tactical level, but failed to win the information war at 
the strategic level and therefore was defeated by a lesser power.  In the War on Terror, 
the United States can defuse the al Qaeda justification of “defensive jihad” by attaining 
greater understanding of the impact of its own actions on Muslim cultures.  Efforts by the 
United States to push democracy on Muslim nations without first providing common 
access to basic needs, safety, security, and self-determination have a high probability of 
being counter-productive and achieving unintended negative results. 
A national formal transformation process, modeled on that of the Department of 
Defense, should be established to redefine the concept of war and develop offensive and 
defensive strategies against both Fourth Generation (insurgent) Warfare (4GW) and Fifth 
Generation (unrestricted) Warfare (5GW).  As Stavridis states in Deconstructing War, 
“War is changing, and not for the better.  Like much else in our world, it is essentially 
deconstructing and re-emerging as a changed enterprise.”177  If the United States does not 
redefine war and its attendant rules, then it runs the risk of having it defined by its 
enemies.178  The descriptions of Fifth Generation (unrestricted) Warfare (5GW) provided 
by Liang and Xiangsui, and illustrated in Chapter IV, are examples of threats that will 
confront the Nation as part of its new strategic reality.  They demonstrate clearly that no 
longer will one size fit all in matters of war.  The United States must develop its own 
version of unrestricted warfare. 
 
                                                 
177 James Stavridis, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy, “Deconstructing War,” United States Naval Institute, 
Proceedings, December 2005.  
178 Gartska and Alberts, Network Centric Operations Conceptual Framework, 7. 
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To defeat the principles of Fifth Generation (unrestricted) Warfare (5GW) will 
require a fundamental re-definition of the concept of force, obstacles to its generation, 
and how it is applied to achieve victory.  The new concept of force will have three 
essential components: 
• The unrestricted use 
• of the elements of national power – political, diplomatic, social, economic, 
military, law enforcement – 
• to fight total war, rather than limited war for political objectives.   
This principle was touched upon by General John Abizaid in a speech at the 
Naval War College: “Our primary enemy is not the insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
It is al Qaeda and their ideology…The battle against al Qaeda will not be primarily 
military.  It will be political, economic, and ideological.  It will require the international 
community to fight too.”179  In the end, a re-defined concept of force must incorporate  
the expanded definition provided by Liang and Xiangsui, “all means, including armed 
force or non-armed forced, military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal to compel 
the enemy to accept one’s interest.”180 
Finally, as stated at the beginning of this thesis the War on Terror, as the outcome 
of the al Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 
2001, promises to be the effort of a generation.  If the United States is to sustain its effort 
for the years and decades that will be required for it to achieve victory, and maintain the 
momentum necessary to its success, it must fundamentally change its thinking.   It will be 
necessary to move away from the inductive approach of the past – looking for 
weaknesses, gaps, and deficiencies, and determining how to correct them; and toward 
deductive thinking and adaptive capabilities-based planning for the future – a conscious 
search for the unexpected and an expansion of the bounds of feasibility.181    
                                                 
179 John Abizaid, General, U.S. Army.  Student notes from a speech given by General Abizaid, 
Commander, United States Central Command, at the Naval War College in November 2005.  
http://www.rfpartners.com/usma.htm  (accessed 02/09/06). 
180 Liang and Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, xxii. 
181 Cebrowski, “Transformation and the Changing Character of War,” 2. 
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